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ABSTRACT
Essays on Household Finance:
Income, Consumption, Debt, and Financial Delinquency
BY
Philippe d’Astous
March 17th, 2016
Committee Chair: Stephen Shore
Major Academic Unit: Department of Risk Management and Insurance
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter uses credit card data to esti-
mate the impact of increasing minimum payments on delinquency, payments, spending, and
write-offs. The identification strategy exploits an unusual institutional feature: borrowers
can use their account to make purchases with both revolving loans (on which minimum
payments increased) and term loans (on which there was no change). Payment increases by
delinquent borrowers are insufficient to match increasing minimums, resulting in lower cure
rates and an increase in write-offs. Affected borrowers migrate away from these accounts by
decreasing charges and increasing payments, consequently lowering the interest earned by
the bank.
The second chapter analyzes the response of consumption, debt, and delinquency to an
anticipated increase in cash-on-hand in the presence of liquidity constraints. It uses account-
level data from a North American bank that allows clients to make purchases using credit
card and term loans on the same account. Term loans are paid off in a predetermined num-
ber of equal monthly installments. The end of a term loan therefore generates a predictable
increase in cash-on-hand relative to months in which payments were required. Consistent
with a model in which consumers are potentially liquidity constrained, consumers ex-ante
identified as unconstrained do not increase their credit card expenditures, constrained con-
sumers increase both their credit card expenditures and balance, and consumers for whom
the credit card is the marginal source of funds decrease their balance. The propensity to take
out a new term loan increases for all consumers, whether constrained or not. About 4% of
unconstrained consumers delay taking out a new term loan until the original loan is repaid,
contrary to theoretical predictions. Paying off the term loan reduces financial delinquency
and the probability of default.
The third chapter analyzes the comovement of personal savings and income using ad-
ministrative data provided by a North American bank that records the sum of monthly
direct deposit income into its clients’ checking accounts. It investigates how permanent and
transitory income changes are smoothed by checking account balances. Transitory income
changes, whether positive or negative, have only transitory effects on checking account bal-
ances, suggesting that consumption is excessively sensitive to them compared to theoretical
predictions. Permanent income changes lead to permanent adjustments in consumption and
modest permanent adjustments in checking account balances, consistent with theoretical
predictions. There is evidence of anticipation of future income changes as much as three
months in advance.
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Chapter 1
Liquidity Constraints and Credit Card Delinquency:
Evidence from Raising Minimum Payments1
Abstract
We use credit card data to estimate the impact of increasing minimum payments on
delinquency, payments, spending, and write-offs. Our identification strategy exploits an
unusual institutional feature: borrowers can use their account to make purchases with both
revolving loans (on which minimum payments increased) and term loans (on which there was
no change). Payment increases by delinquent borrowers are insufficient to match increasing
minimums, resulting in lower cure rates and an increase in write-offs. Affected borrowers
migrate away from these accounts by decreasing charges and increasing payments, consequently
lowering the interest earned by the bank.
JEL Classification: D12, D14, E21, G21.
1This essay is co-authored with Stephen Shore and is forthcoming in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis. We are grateful to Chris Carroll, Pierre-Andre´ Chiaporri, Keith Crocker, Glenn Harrison, Benjamin
Keys, Maurizio Mazzocco, Kathleen McGarry, Corina Mommaerts, Noah Stoffman, and Tyson Van Alfen for helpful
comments. We also thank seminar participants at the Cornell University IBHF Symposium on Household and
Behavioral Finance, the Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank Household Economics and Decision Making Conference, the
Georgia State University Income Risk Workshop, the 2015 FMA Annual Meetings, and the Huebner PhD Colloquium
in Seattle for their valuable suggestions.
1.1 Introduction
Credit cards provide revolving lines of credit with low minimum monthly payments, typically
1% to 5% of the balance. Borrowers who choose to make only these minimum payments can
take years to pay down their loan completely. Of the 68% of households holding at least one
credit card, 55% revolve a balance (2010 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances) and 18% make
the minimum required payment on the account each month (TransUnion).
The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009 in-
creased transparency and restricted fees that could be charged on credit cards. To nudge
borrowers into repaying their debt faster, the CARD Act forced issuers to disclose; a) the
time needed to pay down the balance when making only the minimum payment, and b) the
monthly payment required to pay down the balance in 36 months. These disclosure rules
increased the payments made by borrowers who were previously paying only a small fraction
of their balance (Agarwal et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2014; Keys and Wang, 2014).
We use proprietary data from a large North American bank for which the minimum
payment required to remain current on credit card accounts was increased from 3% to 5%
of the revolving balance.2 Examining this change allows us to determine the impact of an
actual increase in credit card minimum payments, as opposed to the impact of a disclosure
rule intended to nudge borrowers into making higher debt repayment.
Our identification strategies exploit two different dimensions in which borrowers could
be more or less affected by the policy. First, based on the nature of their credit card
debt, minimum payments increased more for some borrowers than others. The bank allows
borrowers to use their credit card to make purchases on both revolving loans (with no fixed
term, on which the minimum payments increased) and term loans (with a fixed interest
rate and repayment schedule, on which there was no policy change). Borrowers differ in the
proportion of their revolving credit and, consequently, in the size of the minimum payment
increase. Second, some borrowers are more affected than others, based on the revolving
2Minimum payment requirements bind for roughly 10% of borrowers in our sample. For these borrowers,the
marginal cost of outside funds exceeds the interest rate on the credit card but is lower than the shadow cost of
delinquency. The outside cost of funds could result from borrowing elsewhere or from reducing spending.
1
balance share they wish to pay down. Borrowers who wish to pay the balance in full are
unaffected by the change. We use borrowers’ payment histories to identify ex-ante those who
are likely to make minimum payments and are therefore affected by the increase. Changes
following the policy introduction are limited to borrowers for whom minimum payments
actually increased and, within that group, to those likely to make minimum payments.
We exploit both variations in an identification strategy akin to difference-in-differences: we
compare the difference in outcomes across borrowers differently exposed to — or affected by
— the minimum payment increase, before and after its implementation.
We examine the effect of minimum payment increases on payments, spending, delin-
quency, and write-offs. Current borrowers comply with the policy by consistently making
the increased minimum payments. For delinquent borrowers, the payment increase is not
sufficient to match the new minimum payment required; this results in a drop in cure rates
(the rate at which accounts go from delinquent to current). The lower cure rate leads to a
spike in write-offs six months after the policy change, as it takes six months for a current
account to default when no additional payments are made on the account. In response to
the policy change, the affected borrowers reduce spending on their credit card, increase their
payments and, consequently, reduce their revolving balance. We investigate the transitory
nature of the increase in write-offs and find it is driven by the group of borrowers identified
ex-ante as those making small payments on their revolving debt, and were therefore most
likely to be constrained by the new minimum payment requirement. The bank is affected
by the increased write-offs and by the loss of interest revenues due to decreasing balances.
Our findings relate to a growing body of literature investigating credit card debt paydown
in response to nudges (see discussion on the CARD Act above), institutional changes in
minimum payments, and self-set goals. Traditional models have a difficult time explaining
why borrowers would revolve a large amount of credit card debt while simultaneously holding
low-yield liquid assets (Zinman, 2015). This has been called the “credit card debt puzzle”.
Such behavior can be rationalized with present-biased preferences (Meier and Sprenger,
2010; Skiba and Tobacman, 2008), although Telyukova (2013) shows the need for liquidity
can almost fully explain why rational borrowers would hold both liquid assets and revolving
2
debt simultaneously. Disentangling liquidity constraints (Carroll and Kimball, 1996; Carroll,
2001; Carroll and Kimball, 2005)3 from hyperbolic discounting (Angeletos et al., 2001) can
be challenging. Kuchler (2015) investigates credit card paydown for borrowers who sign up
for a self-set planned payment schedule and finds planned debt paydown is the strongest
predictor of actual paydown, although most borrowers fall short of their own goals. After
eliminating potentially constrained borrowers, she suggests hyperbolic discounting could
explain borrowers’ failure to maintain a self-set repayment plan.
We find that borrowers most likely to make minimum payments also reduce spending
on their card. This reduced spending — coupled with increased payments — leads to a
drop in their revolving balance, and suggests migration away from a product providing an
undesirable repayment schedule. These results are consistent with forward-looking behavior
and inconsistent with naive hyperbolic discounting.
The paper closest to ours is a working paper by Keys and Wang (2014) which, in addition
to their study of the CARD Act, exploits data from US banks that increased their floor
minimum credit card payment. Our results complement theirs, but the policy change we
study affects higher credit card balances and is likely to bind for more borrowers.4
1.2 Identification and Data
We use credit card data from a North American bank that recently changed its minimum
payment policy. The new policy requires an increase in the fraction of the current revolving
credit card balance that must be paid each month to keep the borrower out of delinquency.
The previous minimum payment was either $10 or 3% of the revolving balance, whichever
3Zeldes (1989) tests for the presence of liquidity constraints by estimating consumption Euler equations for groups
of borrowers who have low assets. Jappelli et al. (1998) define constrained borrowers as those who were previously
refused a loan, or who do not have access to a credit line. Closer to our interpretation of liquidity constraints, Gross
and Souleles (2002a) and Agarwal et al. (2007) argue that households paying high interest rates on their revolving
loans can also be thought of as liquidity constrained, due to the lack of a cheaper source of funding.
4Because floor minimum amounts were low both before and after their policy change, making these payments is
a challenge only for the most constrained borrowers, and only affects low revolving balances. In contrast, the policy
change we study results in a substantial dollar amount increase for the average borrower, due to a much higher initial
balance. For the average revolving balance of $2, 300 in our sample, the minimum payment increases from $69 to
$115.
3
is greater; the minimum increased to either $10 or 5%, whichever is greater.5 For revolving
balances over $333, the new policy represents a 66% increase in minimum payments. This
change became mandatory for all account holders on a specific date, omitted here to protect
data-provider confidentiality.
Borrowers can use their account to make purchases with both revolving loans (with no
fixed term, on which the minimum payments increased) and term loans (with a fixed interest
rate and repayment schedule, on which there was no policy change). Term loans can be
contracted directly from the bank or at select merchants to finance durable goods, and are
repaid in equal monthly installments over 12, 24, 36, 48 or 60 months. Both types of loans
are linked to the same account and there is no penalty for prepaying either. These types of
loans differ in the minimum payment schedule needed to keep the account current.6
Accounts can be current, or 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 cycles delinquent; accounts that are six cycles
delinquent are considered to be in default and must be written off. There is no distinction
between delinquency on the revolving and term loans. The number of cycles delinquent
depends on the payment history, not merely on the number of calendar months the account
has been delinquent. The total minimum payment due is the sum of; a) the minimum
payment on the revolving balance, b) the installment payment on the term balance, and c)
any overdue amount from previously missed payments. For delinquent borrowers, paying
this sum “cures” (makes current) the account; borrowers who pay less than this sum become
or remain delinquent.7 Appendix 1.6 shows a hypothetical account statement.
1.2.1 Identification Strategy
Our analysis highlights two different treatment effects: for exposed and affected borrowers.
We identify the effect of increasing minimum payments; a) for borrowers exposed to the
policy change (for whom minimum payments increased), and b) for the subset of borrowers
5All amounts are presented in local currency.
6For revolving loans, the minimum payment is 3% or 5% of the balance each month. For term loans, the minimum
payment is a fixed dollar amount, and increases as a percentage of the balance from 5.6%, on average, at origination
to 100% just before paydown.
7Accounts move forward in delinquency cycles (e.g., from 1 cycle delinquent to 2 cycles) when the total payment
falls below the sum of (a) and (b) above; accounts can improve in delinquency cycles without curing if a portion of
the overdue amount (c) is paid.
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actually affected by the change (those likely to make minimum payments). First, because
minimum payments increased on revolving balances but not on term loans, borrowers with
a larger share of revolving debt are more exposed to the change. We define exposure to the
policy change as the proportion of revolving balance to total balance:
Prop Revoli,t =
Revolving Balancei,t
Revolving Balancei,t + Term Loan Balancei,t
. (1.1)
Second, the policy change only affects borrowers who were previously making payments
at a level no longer sufficient under the new minimum payment requirement. We identify
those borrowers by constructing a lagged measure of payments made on the revolving loan.
We define affected borrowers using the average fraction of revolving balance repaid as:
%Revol Paidi,t =
Payments Made on the Revolving Account from t to t+ 1
Revolving Balance at t
. (1.2)
For each month t, we then calculate the rolling average of %Revol. Paidi,t over the months
t−12 to t−7 and identify borrowers who were repaying less than 20%. Section 1.3 shows the
effect of the policy is confined to this subset of borrowers. We present these results for the
group of borrowers who do not have a term loan (i.e., their proportion of revolving balance is
equal to 1), although the results could be extended to the entire sample with an appropriate
set of control variables.
Our identification strategy compares the difference in outcomes across borrowers differ-
ently exposed to — or affected by — the minimum payment increase, before and after its
implementation. In Section 1.3, we provide support for this research design by showing how
these accounts followed parallel delinquency trends before the policy change, with the iden-
tifying assumption that they would have continued their parallel trends absent of the policy
change (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Let yi,t be an outcome of interest — typically either payments, new purchases, indicators
for delinquency transitions (e.g., when a current borrower goes delinquent), or write-offs.
5
Our main regression model in the analysis can be expressed as:
yi,t = δ0 + δ1(After?× Treatmenti,t) + δ2Treatmenti,t + δ3 After? + δXXi,t + i,t. (1.3)
“Treatmenti,t” measures whether the borrower is exposed to the policy change (as defined
by equation (1.1)), or affected by the policy change (using a dummy variable to indicate
whether the borrower was previously repaying less than 20% of the revolving balance in
months t− 12 to t− 7, as defined by equation (1.2)). “After?” is an indicator variable that
takes the value of one, if the observation is after the policy change, and zero otherwise. The
key variable of interest is δ1, which shows the response of borrowers affected by — or exposed
to — the change relative to borrowers who are not.
Xi,t represents a vector of controls which vary in a sequence of four increasingly flexible
specifications. The first specification excludes all controls. The second specification adds
controls for; a) month fixed effects, b) a dummy variable indicating if the account only
has a revolving balance, c) its interaction with a linear trend, and d) the interaction of
the proportion of revolving balance with a linear trend. The third specification adds; a)
delinquency cycle dummies, b) the interaction of linear delinquency cycles with a linear
trend, and c) spell dummies (which indicate the number of months an account has spent in
the current delinquency state). The last specification adds; a) six-months lagged measures
of the total account balance, b) six-months lagged measures of the minimum payment that
would have been required under the old policy, and c) the interaction of these variables. For
these last variables, we construct bins that split the sample distribution into quartiles, and
then we interact these dummy variables. In this specification, we also add a set of account
characteristics.8 Standard errors are corrected for within-account heteroscedasticity in all
the specifications presented.
8This set of control variables includes: age and sex of the account holder; an external measure of credit score;
an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower has other accounts at this institution; an indicator variable equal
to one if the borrower pays for a reduced APR; APR charged on the revolving balance; average unemployment rate
in the borrower’s region; account age (in months); revolving credit limit; and utilization of the revolving balance
(defined as revolving balance/revolving limit). All controls are taken at the beginning of the billing cycle to avoid
spurious relationships with the independent variable.
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1.2.2 Data Description
We use administrative data provided by a bank on the universe of its credit card accounts.
Data include monthly information typically found on the front page of credit card statements,
such as total spending, total payments, balance outstanding, interest rate, and delinquency.
Data also include borrowers’ demographic information — sex, age, credit score, and partial
information about their zip code, for example. For accounts that default, we know the date
of default and the amount written off. We do not have access to transaction-level data.
We monitor all accounts opened 12 months prior to the policy change, and follow them for
24 months or until they default, go bankrupt, or are closed in good standing, whichever comes
first. We drop all accounts that were inactive during this subsample, as well as accounts
with any missing months of observations. We focus on the subsequent borrower behavior of
account-months observations with a revolving balance greater than $333 because the floor
minimum payment of $10 did not bind for them, and their minimum payment therefore
increased from 3% to 5%. The final sample covers 2, 152, 786 accounts and 30, 304, 780
account-months observations.9
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the sample. The average total balance is $3, 410,
the average revolving balance is $2, 300 and the remaining $1, 110 is term loan balance. 28%
of the sample has term loans, with an average balance of $3, 947. The total monthly payment
is $971. The average APR charged on the revolving balance is 17.05%. The external credit
score is a bankruptcy prediction score and varies from 1 to 1, 000. Unlike FICO scores, which
predict the probability of missing a payment on the loan, this type of measure predicts the
probability of filing for bankruptcy in the next two years and is typically higher than average
FICO scores.
Table 3.1 also shows the difference between all variables for accounts with high (>
50%) and low (≤ 50%) proportions of revolving balance. Although most variables differ,
Section 1.3 shows these groups followed parallel delinquency trends before the policy change,
consistent with the assumption outlined in our identification strategy. We control for these
9Many accounts never go delinquent, so we undersample them by randomly selecting 10% of them and assigning
them a probability weight of 10. This yields 186, 815 overweighted accounts that never missed a payment in the
period studied. All results presented are adjusted using an inverse probability weighting scheme.
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observable variables in the analysis and show our results are robust to their inclusion.
1.3 Main Results
In Section 1.3.1, we consider the impact of increased minimum payments on transitions into
and out of delinquency, and from delinquency to write-off. We document a one-month,
transitory spike in the share of current loans becoming delinquent and show how this spike
passes through to write-offs six months later. We also show current borrowers comply with
the new minimum payment requirements, so delinquency rates, on average are not affected.
However, delinquent borrowers do not fully comply with the increased minimum payment
requirements, resulting in a permanent drop in the cure rate. We further investigate the
distribution of payments in Section 1.3.2. In Section 1.3.3, we decompose write-offs into
exposure-at-default and the probability of being written-off. We investigate the forces driving
the transitory increase in write-offs in Section 1.3.4, and show that borrowers affected by
the increase in minimum payment reduce spending on the card, increase payments and,
consequently, reduce their revolving balances as well as their future minimum payments.
This provides evidence that borrowers who are most likely to be affected by the policy change
migrate away from a product that no longer provides the desired repayment schedule.
1.3.1 Delinquency Transitions
Each month, an account can transition into one of three mutually exclusive delinquency
states: current (C), delinquent (L), and written-off (W ).10 The write-off state is absorbing.
Table 1.2 presents the proportion of accounts in each delinquency state, and the transition
matrix between them. On average, 88.3% of the active accounts (those not written-off)
are current, and the remaining 11.7% are delinquent. On average, 0.2% of active accounts
are written off each month. A total of 93.7% of current accounts remain current in the
next billing cycle, while 6.3% enter delinquency; virtually none are written off in the next
billing cycle. Among delinquent accounts, 52.3% cure in the following billing cycle, while
10The delinquency state can also be further refined into the exact number of months past due.
9
Table 1.2: Aggregate Transition Probabilities
Ct Lt Wt
Ct+1 0.937 0.523 0.000
Lt+1 0.063 0.460 0.000
Wt+1 0.000 0.017 1.000
% Accounts in each State 88.3% 11.7% n/a
Note: This table shows the average transition probabilities between delinquency states calculated on account-month obser-
vations that have a revolving balance greater than $333 in a 24-month window around the policy change. The states are
defined as (C) if the account is current, (L) if the account is at least one month late, (W ) if the account is written off due
to a default or due to bankruptcy.
46.0% stay delinquent; 1.7% of delinquent accounts are written off each month into default
or bankruptcy.
Figure 1.1 compares transitions before and after the minimum payment increase. The
upper panels show the probability of entering delinquency; the middle panels show the cure
rate for delinquent accounts; the bottom panels show write-off rates for delinquent accounts.
The left panels show the average transition probabilities and the right panels show the
breakdown of accounts with high (≥ 95%) and low (≤ 5%) proportions of revolving balance,
as defined in equation (1.1).11 Before the policy change, both high- and low-proportion-
of-revolving-balance groups followed parallel trends with respect to delinquency transitions.
This provides support for the parallel trend assumption required in this kind of difference-
in-differences analysis (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Panel (a) of Figure 1.1 shows no permanent change in transitions into delinquency, on
average. However, when comparing high- and low-proportion groups, Panel (b) shows the
high-proportion group experienced a spike in the rate of entering delinquency one month after
the policy change. In Panels (e) and (f), this spike evolves into write-offs six months after
the policy change, as it takes six month for an account to be written-off when no payments
are made. The policy change had a permanent effect on the probability of curing delinquent
accounts, as shown in Panels (c) and (d). Cure rates drop, on average, for borrowers with
a high proportion of revolving balance, while they remain stable for accounts with a low
11Figure 1.1 shows month-to-month transitions for accounts with total (not revolving) balances greater than $333
to avoid dropping all but the highest-balance accounts among the group of accounts with a low proportion of revolving
balance.
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Figure 1.1: Transition Probabilities
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Note: This figure plots the aggregate transition probabilities between delinquency states for accounts that have a total bal-
ance greater than $333 in a 24-month window around the policy change. Accounts are defined as having a big (greater
than 95%) and a small (smaller than 5%) proportion of revolving balance to total balance to show the effect of the policy
change for the groups most and least affected. We show month-to-month transitions for accounts with total (not revolv-
ing) balances greater than $333 to avoid dropping all but the highest-balance accounts among the group of accounts with
a low proportion of revolving balance.
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proportion of revolving balance. Panel (f) shows the spike in write-offs six months after the
policy change is confined to borrowers with a high proportion of revolving balance. Note that
the transition rate from delinquency to write-off does not increase substantially, although
a lower cure rate mechanically induces a larger number of accounts to be written-off each
month.
Table 1.3 presents regression evidence on the effect of the policy change on transition
rates. The table shows marginal effects calculated from probit regressions. The first set of
results estimates the probability of entering delinquency for current accounts, and mirrors
results from the top panels of Figure 1.1. Our main coefficient of interest — the interaction
between the policy dummy and the proportion of revolving balance — is positive in all spec-
ifications: increasing minimum payments increases transitions into delinquency. However,
this result is modest; in most specifications (and with varying statistical significance), in-
creasing the minimum payment for current revolving-only accounts increases the probability
of entering delinquency by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points (a 1.6% to 3.3% increase on a base
rate of 6.1% each month). The second set of results in Table 1.3 estimates the probability
that a delinquent account cures, and mirrors results from the middle panels of Figure 1.1.
Increasing minimum payments decreases the probability that an account cures by 5.1 to
8.5 percentage points (an 8.6% to 14.7% decrease on a base rate of 58.0%). These results
are robust and highly significant. The third set of results estimates the probability that a
delinquent account is written off, and mirrors results from the bottom panels of Figure 1.1.
The results show no significant change in the probability that a delinquent account is written
off in specifications with substantial controls (and a modest increase in specifications with
fewer controls). We explore write-offs and the exposure at default further in Section 1.3.3.
Appendix Figure 1.10 compares borrowers who were either repaying less than or more
than 20% of their revolving balance in a rolling window of months, t − 12 to t − 7. The
figure indicates the results presented so far are confined to the group of borrowers who
were previously repaying a small fraction of their balance each month. These borrowers are
characterized by a transitory increase in the probability of entering delinquency, a permanent
decrease in the cure rate, and a spike in write-off six months after the policy change. We
13
Figure 1.2: Proportion of Borrowers Making Payments Needed to Cure the Account
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(b) One Month Delinquent Accounts
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(c) Two Months Delinquent Accounts
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(d) Three+ Months Delinquent Accounts
Note: This figure shows the proportion of account-month payments made relative to the minimum payment for observations
that have a revolving balance greater than $333 in a six-month window around the policy change. The categories classify
borrowers according to their payments being: never sufficient to cure the account; sufficient to cure the account before
but not after the policy change; and always sufficient to cure the account. The counterfactual minimum payments used
are based on the monthly revolving balance. The horizontal line represents the date of the policy change.
further investigate this group of borrowers to explain migration away from the credit card
in Section 1.3.4.
1.3.2 Payments
Delinquency transitions are determined by the proportion of borrowers who make at least
the minimum payments. To show the effect of the policy change on the segment of borrowers
making the minimum payment, we construct counterfactual payments that would be required
under the 3% and 5% rules. We classify monthly payments made into three categories:
payments never sufficient to cure the account; payments sufficient to cure the account before
but not after the change; and, payments always sufficient to cure the account.
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Figure 1.2 shows that fewer current borrowers make payments sufficient to avoid delin-
quency before than after the policy change. The shift is almost perfect, with only a marginal
increase in accounts paying less than the minimum payment after the policy change. This
is consistent with the weak or absent evidence of increased transitions into delinquency by
current borrowers in Figure 1.1 and Table 1.3. Among delinquent accounts, the fraction of
borrowers who make payments in a range that would be sufficient to cure before but not after
the policy change does not drop substantially; for highly delinquent accounts it barely drops
at all. These results are consistent with the evidence from Figure 1.1 and Table 1.3. The
policy change sharply reduced the cure rate for delinquent accounts, as borrowers continued
to make payments in a range that is no longer sufficient to cure the account.
Figure 1.3 shows the change, induced by the increased minimum payment, in the distri-
bution of payments made each month (as a fraction of the balance). We construct these
estimates with a logistic quantile regression (Bottai et al., 2009) to predict the fraction of
the balance paid using the covariates from our baseline specification.12 The figure shows the
predicted distributions of borrowers with only revolving balances before and after the policy
change. Panel (a) of Figure 1.3 shows that, on average, current borrowers did not change
the fraction of the payments made on the account after the policy change. This is what we
would expect from a policy that affects only the minority of borrowers who were repaying
around 3% of their balances before the policy change. Consistent with the finding that cur-
rent accounts did not significantly increase their probability of entering delinquency, Panel
12Borrowers can pay more than 100% of their balance by making purchases and corresponding payments in the
same billing cycle so we top-code the proportion of the balance paid at 100%. The regression includes observations
in the six-month window around the policy change and is specificied as follows:
Qτ(logit(pmti,t)|Xi) = β0+β1(After?× Prop Revoli,t) + β2Prop Revoli,t + β3Only Revoli,t
+ β4(Only Revoli,t × Trendt) + β5Month F.E.t + i,t, (1.4)
where Qτ(logit(pmti,t)) represents the τth quantile of the pmti,t distribution using the logistic transformation. The
fraction of the balance that is repaid is defined as
pmti,t =
Payments Posted on the Account for Statement of Date t
Total Account Balance for Statement of Date t
. (1.5)
The logistic transformation is given by logit(y) = y−ymin
ymax−y and ensures that predictions of the dependent variable will
not exceed its lower and upper bound limits. We follow Bottai et al. (2009) and add  = 0.001 to allow values of y
on the boundaries. We estimate all quantiles independently, starting at the fifth one and increasing in steps of 5%.
Appendix Table 1.7 presents the regressions used to construct Figure 1.3, including the confidence intervals for the
gap between the “before” and “after” distributions.
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Figure 1.3: Payment Distributions
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0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 P
ai
d
 
Quantile 
Before After
(c) One Month Delinquent Accounts
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(d) Two Month Delinquent Accounts
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(e) Three+ Months Delinquent Accounts
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(f) All Delinquent Accounts Pooled
Note: This figure plots the conditional payment quantiles before and after the policy change as predicted
by the results of Table 1.7, evaluated at a proportion of the revolving balance of 100%.
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(b) of Figure 1.3 shows an increase in current account payments of about 2% around the
tenth percentile of the payment distribution. This is the region in which current borrowers
were previously paying about 3% of their balance, and increased their payments by 2% to
the new minimum of 5%. Panels (c) through (f) of Figure 1.3 show the payment distribu-
tions of delinquent accounts. In general, the effect of the policy on payments is rather weak
for delinquent accounts. Borrowers in their first delinquency cycle increase the percentage
of their account balance paid each month, but the increase is not sufficient to comply with
the minimum payment policy change. Given increased minimum payments, an unchanged
payment distribution reduces the proportion of borrowers whose payments are sufficient to
cure their account.
1.3.3 Write-Offs and Exposure at Default
In this section, we decompose the effect of minimum payments on the rate at which accounts
are written-off, and on the bank’s exposure at default (EAD) for the written-off accounts.
We measure the EAD as the proportion of the total account balance that is written-off at
the time of default (net of any new term loans contracted during the last delinquency spell),
normalized by the total account balance when the account was last current. We consider the
proportion of all loans (current or delinquent) that are written off each month. Figure 1.4
shows the dynamics of the three measures of interest: i) the unconditional EAD in Panels
(a) and (b) (the total exposure faced by the bank averaging over all accounts, including
those not written-off); ii) the unconditional probability of being written-off in Panels (c)
and (d); and, iii) the EAD given that an account has been written-off in Panels (e) and
(f). Results are shown for all accounts (left panels); high and low proportions of revolving
balance are separated (right panels). The average EADs presented are weighted by the last
current balance on the account.
The number of write-offs spikes six months after the policy change (Figure 1.4 Panels (c)
and (d)). This lag is expected; it takes six months for a loan to go from current to write-off
in the absence of any additional payments. The spike appears to be transitory in the figure
and is driven by the increase in the probability of entering delinquency, as shown in Panel
17
Figure 1.4: Write-Offs and Exposure at Default
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Note: This figure plots the EAD (unconditional and conditional on default) and the unconditional write-off probability for
accounts that have a total balance greater than $333 in a 24-month window around the policy change. To show the effect
of the policy change for the groups most and least affected, accounts are defined as having a big (≥ 95%) and a small
(≤ 5%) proportion of revolving balance to total balance. The EADs are weighted by the last current balance on the account.
We present graphs for accounts with total (not revolving) balances greater than $333. This enables us to avoid dropping all
but the highest-balance accounts among the group of accounts with a low proportion of revolving balance.
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(b) of Figure 1.1. The spike in the number of write-offs drives a spike in the total amount
written off (Figure 1.4 Panels (a) and (b)) and reflects larger losses for the bank. Panels (e)
and (f) show the exposure for written-off accounts follows a slight downward trend, although
there is no apparent effect from the policy change.
Table 1.4 presents regression evidence of the policy change effects on the EADs and the
unconditional write-off probability, mirroring the evidence in Figure 1.4. We analyze these
measures six months following the policy change, as it takes six months for a current account
to be written off.13 The first set of results shows an increase in the unconditional exposure
at default. The coefficient is positive and stable across specifications and shows that the
exposure at default increased between 0.06 and 0.1 percentage points (a 32% to 49% on a
baseline of 0.17%). The second set of results shows that the unconditional monthly probabil-
ity of write-off similarly increased between 0.02 and 0.08 percentage points (a 1.2% to 4.7%
increase on a base rate of 1.7% each month). This implies 0.24% to 0.96% of the accounts
were written-off due to the policy in the 12 months following its implementation. Finally, the
last set of results shows that for written-off accounts, the EAD did not change significantly
after the policy change. The increase in total exposure is driven by more write-offs, with
no change in the exposure of written-off accounts. These results are consistent with the
relatively constant rate of transition from delinquency to write-offs shown in Section 1.3.2;
as the cure rate falls, delinquency rises and leads to more write-offs, even though the fraction
of delinquent loans written-off stays relatively stable.
Appendix Figure 1.11 shows that increases in write-offs and the resulting increase in
exposure at default is confined to the group of borrower identified ex ante, as repaying less
than 20% of their revolving balance.
1.3.4 Spending and Balances
In this section, we show the impact of the policy change on borrowers most likely to be
affected by the minimum payment increase; those who were previously making low payments
on their revolving account. We focus on accounts that only have a revolving balance. In
13We also multiply the measure of exposure at default by 100, so coefficients can be interpreted as percentages.
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each month t, we identify the affected borrowers with a dummy variable indicating whether
they were paying an average fraction of their revolving balance smaller than 20% in a rolling
window of months t− 12 to t− 7.
Figure 1.5 shows spending with the credit card in the upper panels, payments on the
account in the middle panels, and credit card balances in the bottom panel. Left panels
show the effect on the full sample, and right panels show the effect on the group of borrowers
identified ex-ante as making low and high revolving payments. We normalize purchases,
payments, and the change in credit card balance by the credit card balance in the previous
billing cycle. The figure does not show an obvious difference in spending between affected
and unaffected borrowers. However, payments by affected borrowers increase, leading to
a reduction in their revolving balance; payments by unaffected borrowers do not change
appreciably. This shows the policy nudged borrowers paying a small fraction toward reducing
their revolving balances, and therefore reduced the interest-incurring debt for the bank.
Table 1.5 quantifies the effect shown in Figure 1.5 and focuses on the 12-month period
around the policy change. The results show a decline in purchases made each month and
suggest borrowers who valued low minimum payments the most are migrating away from this
card.14 Consistent with the graphical evidence presented in Figure 1.5, we find an increase
in payments posted on the account. Affected borrowers decrease their revolving balances
by 1.3% each month, leading to an average balance reduction of 4% during the six months
following the policy implementation. At an average APR of 16% for this group, lost interest
revenue totals 0.3% of their balances.
This suggests that by increasing the payments required each month on the account,
the bank lowered its interest earning balances for the share of borrowers previously paying
small portions of their balance each month, and therefore paying high interest fees. Because
this is also the group of borrowers who experienced a transitory increase in write-offs (see
Appendix Figure 1.11), the data suggest that borrowers who were constrained by the increase
in minimum payment responded by migrating away from a product which no longer offered
14The reduction in spending is robust to different specifications. In a previous version of this paper, we found that
borrowers in the lower quartile of the payment distribution reduce their spending by as much as 4% each month.
These results are available on request.
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Figure 1.5: Spending
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Note: This figure plots spending, payments and revolving balance for account that have no term loan and a revolving balance
greater than $333 in a 24-month window around the policy change. Accounts are defined as making low (smaller than 20%)
and high (greater than 20%) monthly payments on their revolving account to show the effect of the policy change for the
groups most and least affected.
22
Table 1.5: Spending, Payments and Balance
Purchases Payments ∆ Card Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After? × Low %Paid? -0.0019 -0.0067** 0.0179** 0.0133** -0.0133** -0.0129**
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0022)
Low %Paid? -0.8114** -0.4769** -0.6217** -0.4083** -0.0760** 0.0473**
(0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0020)
Month F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Total Bal. Dummies × Min. Pmt Dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Account Characteristics NO YES NO YES NO YES
R2 0.159 0.240 0.438 0.556 0.004 0.042
Observations 9,547,645 8,588,689 9,547,646 8,588,689 9,507,443 8,552,633
Note: This table shows the effect of the policy on purchases, payments and revolving balance (normalized by revolving balance in the
previous billing cycle) using monthly credit card accounts with no term loan and revolving balances greater than $333 in a 12-month
window around the policy change. The set of control variables, which we group under “Account Characteristics” are age and sex
of the account holder, an external measure of credit score, an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower has other accounts at
this institution, an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower pays for a reduced APR, APR charged on the revolving balance,
average unemployment rate in the borrower’s region, account age (in months), revolving credit limit and utilization of the revolving
balance (defined as revolving balance/revolving limit). All controls are taken at the beginning of the billing cycle to avoid spurious
relationships with the independent variable. Standard errors are corrected for within account heteroscedasticity in all the specifica-
tions presented. ** and * represent significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
a desirable repayment schedule.
1.4 Extensions
1.4.1 Regression Kink Design
The minimum payment is either $10, or 3% / 5% of the revolving balance, whichever is
greater. This maximum structure implies that the minimum payment is a kinked function of
the revolving balance and suggests a regression kink design (RKD) to identify the effect of
minimum payments while controlling non-parametrically for balance (Appendix Figure 1.9
plots the effect of the policy on the minimum monthly payment required on the revolving
balance). This approach reveals the effect of very small increases in minimum payments,
around the floor of $10, that must be repaid when the balance is under $334 (before the
policy change), or under $200 (after the policy change). This is analogous to the changes in
floor payment studied by Keys and Wang (2014), although our kinks are at lower balances
than theirs.
We retain observations of accounts that have only a revolving balance, during a window
of six months around the policy change, and we identify off the two kinks implied by the
policy change. Figure 1.6 shows average transition probabilities, purchases, and payments
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Figure 1.6: Average Outcomes Around the Minimum Payment Kinks
(a) P(Lt+1|Ct) (b) P(Ct+1|Lt)
(c) P(Wt+1|Lt) (d) Purchases
(e) Payments
Note: This figure plots average outcomes before and after the minimum payment change for accounts with a revolving balance
between $0 and $500 in a six-month window around the policy change.
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Table 1.6: Kink Regression Design
Min. Payment P(Lt+1|Ct) P(Ct+1|Lt) P(Wt+1|Lt) Purchases Payments
A. First Kink ($100 < Revolving Balance < $334)
After × (CardBalance− 200)/100 3.1560*** 0.0028** -0.0113 -0.0020 -14.8554* -6.4223
(0.005) (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (8.277) (6.311)
(CardBalance− 200)/100 -1.2392*** 0.0150** 0.0354 -0.0110 199.4779***108.2610***
(0.019) (0.007) (0.052) (0.012) (48.293) (37.771)
Month F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Revol. Bal. Dummies ($5 bins) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Revol. Bal. Dummies × Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.985 0.001 0.019 0.002 0.007 0.012
Observations 1,392,264 1,318,166 70,633 70,633 1,392,264 1,392,264
B. Second Kink ($200 < Revolving Balance < $500)
After × (CardBalance− 334)/100 3.2652*** 0.0084*** -0.0385*** 0.0004 11.5744 4.4177
(0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (7.938) (5.829)
(CardBalance− 334)/100 -0.4367*** 0.0157** 0.0344 0.0052 86.1159* 66.9560*
(0.022) (0.008) (0.051) (0.012) (49.559) (39.770)
Month F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Revol. Bal. Dummies ($5 bins) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Revol. Bal. Dummies × Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.995 0.001 0.020 0.002 0.005 0.007
Observations 1,316,835 1,230,181 84,441 84,441 1,316,835 1,316,835
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of equation (1.6) for values of k equal to 200 and 334, using monthly credit card accounts with revolving balances
around each kinks in a six-month window around the policy change. Standard errors are corrected for within account heteroscedasticity. ** and * represent significance
at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
before and after the policy change around the kinks. Only the probability of curing the
account seems to be affected by the kinks.
Following the typical strategy in regression kink designs (Card et al., 2012), we quantify
the effect implied around the kinks through the equation
yi,t = β0 + β1After×
(Revolving Balancei,t − kj)
100
+ β2Xi,t + i,t, (1.6)
where kj represents either the 200 or 334 kink marks, “After?” is an indicator variable that
takes the value of one if the observation is after the policy change and zero otherwise, and
Xi,t, includes month fixed effects and a set of dummy variables for revolving balance in $5
bins. Everything is centered around the kinks and normalized by 100. The coefficient of
interest is β1, which measures the impact of increasing the revolving balance by $100 in the
regions around the kinks.
Table 1.6 presents the results. Panel A shows the effect around the first kink and Panel B
shows the effect around the second kink. The first column shows the identification strategy
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works in identifying the increase in minimum payment. The next columns show the tran-
sition probabilities and present results similar to our main analysis. There is a negligible
increase in the probability of entering delinquency and a decrease in the probability of exit-
ing delinquency, although it is only statistically significant for the $334 kink. In this range
of revolving balances, the probability of exiting delinquency is close to 75%, so a decrease
of 3.85 percentage points in the probability of an account curing represents a drop of about
5%. This is smaller than the effect we find in the main analysis for accounts with higher
balances. The last two columns indicate the average purchases and payments made on the
card were not significantly affected by the policy change in this region of revolving balances.
1.4.2 Different Measures for the Proportion of Revolving Balance
The policy change could affect the proportion of revolving balances; a) if borrowers switch to
term loans in response to the minimum payment increase, or b) if revolving balances increase
for consumers who do not comply with the higher minimum payments. However, Panel (a)
and (b) of Figure 1.8 respectively show the rate at which term loans are contracted and the
average proportion of revolving balance are stable in the 24-month window around the policy
change.15 As a robustness check, we verify our results hold with alternative measures of the
proportion of revolving balance.
We first run two-stage least squares regressions on the probability of delinquency tran-
sitions. The proportion of revolving balance is instrumented by its value, lagged by six
months. Its interaction with the policy dummy is instrumented using the policy dummy
in interaction with the six-month lagged proportion of revolving balance. We restrict the
sample period to 12 months around the policy change so the policy change does not affect
the instrument. Table 1.8 shows that the first stages have strong predictive power. The
second stage regressions show our main results do not change once we instrument the pro-
portion of revolving balance. We still find that the probability of entering delinquency only
15As a loss mitigation strategy, the bank offers the possibility for severely delinquent borrowers to consolidate their
revolving balance into a term loan. If borrowers who cannot sustain the increase in minimum payment consolidate
their revolving balance into a term loan, it limits our ability to find an effect from the policy. Panel (c) of Figure 1.8
shows there is evidence of an increase in the conversion of revolving loans to term loans as a result of the policy
change, although the rate of conversion is still smaller than 0.025% at its peak.
26
marginally increased following the minimum payment increase, and the probability of exiting
delinquency decreased by about 8.80 percentage points.
As a second robustness check, we use the average proportion of revolving balance in the
six months before the start of our sample as the main identifying variable. For this exercise,
accounts have a fixed value for the proportion of revolving balance which is not affected by
the policy change. Table 1.9 shows our main results still hold; we estimate an increase in the
probability of entering delinquency between 0.13 to 0.79 percentage points and a decrease in
the probability of curing the account by 5.11 to 9.48 percentage points.
1.4.3 Falsification Test
Accounts with revolving balances under $200 are not affected by the policy change at all
because their minimum repayment is equal to the floor amount ($10) both before and after
the change. We thus perform a falsification test by retaining only accounts with balances
under $200, but above $10, and perform the delinquency analysis again. The results are
presented in Table 1.11 and show that the policy change did not affect the delinquency
outcome with any economic significance.
1.4.4 Heterogeneous Effects
We investigate the effect of the minimum payment increase through the heterogeneous effects
of several account characteristics: the revolving balance (measured both in dollars and as
a proportion of the limit); the external credit score; and whether the account holder also
holds other accounts with the institution. We re-estimate the probit models presented in
Table 1.3 under specification (4) and interact the policy dummy with the proportion of
revolving balance and these characteristics.
Panels A and B of Table 1.10 show the effect of the policy was more severe for accounts
with a higher-dollar amount revolving balance, but not as a proportion of the credit limit.
Accounts with higher balances are more likely to become delinquent and less likely to cure
as a result of the policy change. There is evidence that a higher revolving balance also leads
to a higher probability of write-off. Panel C shows borrowers with better external scores
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were less affected by the policy change as one would imagine. Finally, Panel D shows that
account holders who conduct additional business with the institution have lower write-off
rates as a result of the policy change.
1.5 Conclusion
We document the effect of increasing minimum credit card payments using data from a large
North American bank that increased its minimum payment from 3% to 5% of the revolving
balance. This change contrasts with the disclosure rules imposed by the 2009 CARD Act,
which merely nudged borrowers into repaying their balance faster, but did not impose higher
minimum payments.
Liquidity constraints and inconsistent time preferences have been used to rationalize why
some borrowers simultaneously hold both low-yield liquid assets and high-interest credit card
debt (Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Skiba and Tobacman, 2008; Telyukova, 2013). Our analysis
does not shed light on the role of behavioral biases in explaining the reason for credit card
debt in the first place. However, our findings show that most affected borrowers respond
to the policy change by increasing their payments. We also show evidence of forward-
looking behavior; borrowers who are most likely to be affected by minimum payments in the
future respond by reducing spending and lowering their revolving balance. This suggests a
desire to reduce future minimum payments, or to migrate away from a product providing an
undesirable repayment schedule. This forward-looking behavior is inconsistent with myopia
and other naive present-biased preferences.
We show that a number of delinquent borrowers, who had previously made minimum
payments, fail to comply fully with the new minimum. This implies that, for these borrow-
ers, the cost of the next-cheapest source of funds exceeds the shadow cost of delinquency.
This contrasts with current borrowers, whose ability to increase payments and comply with
higher minimums suggests their next-cheapest cost of funds is lower than the shadow cost
of delinquency.
For the bank, the change in policy has two important consequences. First, increasing
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the minimum payment leads to an increase in delinquency, which ultimately passes through
to write-offs. The unconditional probability of write-off increases between 0.02 and 0.08
percentage points each month. This implies that, due to the policy, 0.24% to 0.96% of
the accounts were written-off in the 12 months following its implementation. Part of this
effect comes from a transitory spike in write-offs exactly six months after the policy was
implemented; it takes six months for an account to transition from delinquency to write-off.
Second, because borrowers reduce their revolving balances, the policy change results in lower
interest fees collected by the bank. Affected borrowers decrease their revolving balances by
1.3% each month, leading to an average balance reduction of 4% during the six months
following the policy implementation. At an average APR of 16% for this group, this balance
reduction amounts to lost interest revenue of 0.3% of their balances.
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1.6 Appendix
Figure 1.7: Account Statement Example
Account Statement 
Statement Date: 02-12-2014 Due Date: 03-10-2014 Account Number: XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX 
John Smith 
123 Street 
Townsville 
North America 
Total Minimum Payment Due: 
 
$ 81.49 
Amount Paid: 
$ ___________________ 
(this amount  will be applied to you current balance) 
Account Summary: 
Previous Balance      $1,500 
 
Purchases and Adjustments  + $1,000 
Cash Advances  + $0 
Interest Charges  + $0 
Monthly Term loan Installment + $31.49 
Payments and other Credits  -  $1,500 
 
Current Balance  = $1,031.49 
Credit Card Limit:   5,000 
Credit Card Available:   4,000 
Annual Percentage Rate (APR):  19.90% 
Total Minimum  
Payment Due: 
Minimum Payment on 
Revolving  Balance 
Monthly Payment on 
the Term Loan 
Overdue  Amount 
$ 50 $ 31.49 $ 0 
Total Minimum 
Payment Due 
$ 81.49 + + = 
Information concerning total 
account balance: 
Current Balance Term Loan Balance 
$ 1,031.49 $ 552.36 
Total Account 
Balance 
$1,583.85  + = 
Term loan information 
Previous Balance on 
the Term Loan 
Variation in the 
Principal Amount 
$ 580.44 $ 0 
New Balance on 
the Term Loan 
$ 552.36 = 
Principal Interest Total 
Detailed Current Payment 
$ 28.08 $ 3.41 $ 31.49 
$ 31.49 
     $ 3.41 
+ $ 548.95 
Note: This figure shows a typical account statement for a borrower at the bank. The monthly statement presents information
about the revolving and term loans on the account. The total minimum payment due consists of the minimum payment on
the credit card balance, the monthly term loan payment, and the overdue amount. The monthly payment on the term loan
consists of the installment due on the term loan in the current month. The overdue amount consists of the cumulative amount
that arises from paying less than the total minimum payment due on previous statements.
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Figure 1.8: Term and Revolving Loans
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Note: This figure shows term and revolving borrowing in the 24-month period around the policy change. Panel (a) shows the
rate of new term loans being opened each month. Panel (b) shows the rate of conversions from revolving to term loans each
month. Panel (c) shows the average proportion of revolving balance to total account balance for current and delinquent
accounts.
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Figure 1.9: Minimum Revolving Payment - Before and After the Policy Change
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Before
After
10 200 334 Revolving Balance ($) 
Minimum Payment  due 
on the Revolving Balance ($) 
Note: This figure shows the effect of the policy change on the monthly minimum payment due on the revolving balance.
The solid and dashed lines, respectively, represent the minimum payment schedules on the revolving balance before
and after the policy change. The minimum payment on the revolving balance must be added to the monthly installment
on the term loan (if the borrower has one) to yield the total monthly minimum payment.
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Table 1.7: Payments - Quantile Regressions
Quantile Regressions Least Squares
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS
A. Current Accounts
After Change × Prop. Revolving Bal. 0.016*** 0.006*** -0.030*** 0.014*** 0.004*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Prop. of Revolving Bal 0.025*** 0.040*** 0.153*** 0.210*** 0.242*** 0.293***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.050*** 0.084*** 0.112*** 0.061***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 6,757,276 6,757,276 6,757,276 6,757,276 6,757,276 6,757,276
B. 1 Month Late
After Change × Prop. Revolving Bal. - 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.033*** -0.021*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.002)
Prop. of Revolving Bal - 0.033*** 0.066*** 0.246*** 0.272*** 0.181***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002)
Constant - 0.022*** 0.051*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.069***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 693,012 693,012 693,012 693,012 693,012
C. 2 Months Late
After Change × Prop. Revolving Bal. - 0.003 0.004** 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.023) (0.004)
Prop. of Revolving Bal - 0.030*** 0.069*** 0.145*** 0.514*** 0.148***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.018) (0.004)
Constant - 0.009*** 0.040*** 0.084*** 0.132*** 0.047***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002)
Observations 155,738 155,738 155,738 155,738 155,738
D. 3+ Months Late
After Change × Prop. Revolving Bal. - - -0.003*** -0.008* -0.008 -0.002
(0.000) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Prop. of Revolving Bal - - 0.009*** 0.076*** 0.188*** 0.080***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
Constant - - 0.003*** 0.105*** 0.116*** 0.056***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Observations 89,884 89,884 89,884 89,884
E. All Late Accounts
After Change × Prop. Revolving Bal. - 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.025*** -0.015*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002)
Prop. of Revolving Bal - 0.023*** 0.063*** 0.207*** 0.245*** 0.158***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
Constant - 0.074*** 0.090*** 0.178*** 0.314*** 0.139***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 938,634 938,634 938,634 938,634 938,634
Note: This table shows the estimation of quantile regressions for which the independent variable is the ratio of payments to total account bal-
ance, as defined by equation (1.5). The sample used consists of observations that have a revolving balance greater than $333 in a six-month
window around the policy change. Additional unreported controls are month fixed effects, a dummy variable indicating if the account has
only a revolving balance and its interaction with a linear trend. For delinquent accounts, dummies for the delinquency cycle and their
interaction with a linear trend are included. Some quantiles in the lower end of the payment distribution did not converge due to insuffi-
cient variation in the dependent variable and are therefore omitted. Because the dependent variable does not vary much in the tails of the
distribution, some of the quantiles estimated do not converge. For this reason, in the graphics presented, we use the nearest converging
quantile to replace ones that did not converge. This only affects some very small quantiles of the payment distribution in regions where the
repayment is in any case 0%. ** and * represent significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
33
Figure 1.10: Transition Probabilities
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Note: This figure plots the aggregate transition probabilities between delinquency states for accounts with no term loans that have
a revolving balance greater than $333 in a 24-month window around the policy change. Accounts are ex ante identified as repaying
a big (greater than 20%) and a small (smaller than 20%) proportion of the revolving balance according to equation (1.2) which is first
averaged over six months and then lagged by six months.
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Figure 1.11: Write-Offs and Exposure at Default
.
00
2
.
00
3
.
00
4
.
00
5
.
00
6
.
00
7
EA
D
tt-12 t-6 t+6 t+12
Time (Months)
(a) EADt+1|Lt or Ct
0
.
00
2
.
00
4
.
00
6
.
00
8
.
01
EA
D
tt-12 t-6 t+6 t+12
Time (Months)
Low Revolving Payments
High Revolving Payments
(b) EADt+1|Lt or Ct
.
00
1
.
00
15
.
00
2
.
00
25
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
tt-12 t-6 t+6 t+12
Time (Months)
(c) P(Wt+1|Ct or Lt)
0
.
00
2
.
00
4
.
00
6
.
00
8
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
tt-12 t-6 t+6 t+12
Time (Months)
Low Revolving Payments
High Revolving Payments
(d) P(Wt+1|Ct or Lt)
1.
02
1.
04
1.
06
1.
08
1.
1
1.
12
EA
D
tt-12 t-6 t+6 t+12
Time (Months)
(e) EADt+1|Lt or Ct, and Wt+1 = 1
1
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
1.
4
EA
D
tt-12 t-6 t+6 t+12
Time (Months)
Low Revolving Payments
High Revolving Payments
(f) EADt+1|Lt or Ct, and Wt+1 = 1
Note: This figure plots the EAD (unconditional and conditional on default) and the unconditional write-off probability for accounts
with no term loans that have a revolving balance greater than $333 in a 24-month window around the policy change. Accounts are
ex ante identified as repaying a big (greater than 20%) and a small (smaller than 20%) proportion of the revolving balance according
to equation (1.2) which is first averaged over six months and then lagged by six months. The EADs are weighted by the last current
balance on the account.
35
T
ab
le
1.
8:
2S
L
S
D
el
in
q
u
en
cy
T
ra
n
si
ti
on
s
F
ir
st
S
ta
g
es
|C
t
In
st
ru
m
en
te
d
2
n
d
S
ta
g
e
F
ir
st
S
ta
g
es
|L
t
In
st
ru
m
en
te
d
2
n
d
S
ta
g
es
P
ro
p
.
R
ev
o
l
A
ft
er
C
h
a
n
g
e
×P
ro
p
.
R
ev
o
l
P(
L
t+
1
|C
t
)
P
ro
p
.
R
ev
o
l
A
ft
er
C
h
a
n
g
e
×
P
ro
p
.
R
ev
o
l
P(
C
t+
1
|L
t
)
P(
W
t+
1
|L
t
)
A
ft
er
C
h
a
n
g
e
×
P
ro
p
.
R
ev
o
lv
.
0
.0
1
3
9
*
*
-0
.0
8
8
0
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
8
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
P
ro
p
.
R
ev
o
lv
in
g
L
o
a
n
0
.0
3
7
7
*
*
-0
.0
1
2
7
*
*
0
.0
0
8
5
*
*
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
A
ft
er
C
h
a
n
g
e
×
P
ro
p
.
R
ev
o
lv
. t
−
6
-0
.0
0
1
8
0
.5
3
2
9
*
*
0
.0
0
4
0
*
0
.6
8
1
4
*
*
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
P
ro
p
.
R
ev
o
lv
. t
−
6
0
.3
6
9
7
*
*
-0
.0
7
8
9
*
*
0
.5
4
2
9
*
*
-0
.0
6
8
1
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
M
o
n
th
F
.E
.
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
O
n
ly
R
ev
o
lv
.
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
O
n
ly
R
ev
o
lv
.
×
T
re
n
d
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
P
ro
p
.
R
ev
o
lv
.
×
T
re
n
d
N
O
N
O
N
O
N
O
N
O
N
O
N
O
B
a
l.
D
u
m
m
ie
s
×
M
in
.
P
ay
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
D
el
in
q
u
en
cy
D
u
m
m
ie
s
-
-
-
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
D
el
in
q
u
en
cy
×
T
re
n
d
-
-
-
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
S
p
el
l
D
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
A
cc
o
u
n
t
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
R
2
0
.7
9
2
0
.9
5
8
0
.0
7
6
0
.8
5
6
0
.9
6
4
0
.2
0
6
0
.3
6
6
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
9
,8
1
0
,1
6
8
9
,8
1
0
,1
6
8
9
,8
1
0
,1
6
8
1
,4
4
9
,0
0
3
1
,4
4
9
,0
0
3
1
,4
4
9
,0
0
3
1
,4
4
9
,0
0
3
N
o
te
:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
o
w
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
o
f
tw
o
-s
ta
g
e
le
a
st
sq
u
a
re
s
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
th
e
d
el
in
q
u
en
cy
tr
a
n
si
ti
o
n
s.
T
h
e
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
re
v
o
lv
in
g
b
a
la
n
ce
is
in
st
ru
m
en
te
d
b
y
it
s
v
a
lu
e
la
g
g
ed
o
f
si
x
m
o
n
th
s
w
h
il
e
it
s
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
th
e
p
o
li
cy
d
u
m
m
y
is
in
st
ru
m
en
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
p
o
li
cy
d
u
m
m
y
in
te
ra
ct
ed
w
it
h
th
e
si
x
-m
o
n
th
la
g
g
ed
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
re
v
o
lv
in
g
b
a
la
n
ce
.
T
h
e
se
t
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
g
ro
u
p
ed
u
n
d
er
“
A
cc
o
u
n
t
R
is
k
”
a
re
a
g
e
a
n
d
se
x
o
f
th
e
a
cc
o
u
n
t
h
o
ld
er
,
in
te
rn
a
l
a
n
d
ex
te
rn
a
l
m
ea
su
re
s
o
f
cr
ed
it
sc
o
re
,
a
n
in
d
ic
a
to
r
v
a
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
if
th
e
b
o
rr
o
w
er
h
a
s
o
th
er
a
cc
o
u
n
ts
a
t
th
e
sa
m
e
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
,
a
n
in
d
ic
a
to
r
v
a
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
if
th
e
b
o
rr
o
w
er
p
a
y
s
fo
r
a
re
d
u
ce
d
A
P
R
,
A
P
R
ch
a
rg
ed
o
n
th
e
re
v
o
lv
in
g
b
a
la
n
ce
,
a
v
er
a
g
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
in
th
e
b
o
rr
o
w
er
’s
re
g
io
n
,
a
cc
o
u
n
t
a
g
e
(i
n
m
o
n
th
s)
,
re
v
o
lv
in
g
cr
ed
it
li
m
it
,
re
v
o
lv
in
g
b
a
la
n
ce
,
u
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
re
v
o
lv
in
g
b
a
la
n
ce
(d
efi
n
ed
a
s
re
v
o
lv
in
g
b
a
la
n
ce
/
re
v
o
lv
in
g
li
m
it
),
to
ta
l
a
cc
o
u
n
t
b
a
la
n
ce
,
a
n
d
m
o
n
th
ly
in
st
a
ll
m
en
t
o
n
th
e
te
rm
lo
a
n
.
A
ll
co
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
ta
k
en
a
t
th
e
b
eg
in
n
in
g
o
f
th
e
b
il
li
n
g
cy
cl
e
to
a
v
o
id
sp
u
ri
o
u
s
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s
w
it
h
th
e
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
co
rr
ec
te
d
fo
r
w
it
h
in
a
cc
o
u
n
t
h
et
er
o
sc
ed
a
st
ic
it
y.
*
*
a
n
d
*
re
p
re
se
n
t
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
a
n
d
5
p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
36
Table 1.9: Using Pre-Policy Average of Proportion Revolving
P(Lt+1|Ct) P(Ct+1|Lt) P(Wt+1|Lt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After Change × Prop. Revol. 0.0013** 0.0079** -0.0948** -0.0511** 0.0010* -0.0014*
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0004) (0.0006)
After? -0.0028** 0.0003 -0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0004)
Prop. Revol. -0.0167** 0.0018 0.2516** -0.0274** -0.0064** 0.0029**
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Month F.E. NO YES NO YES NO YES
Only Revolv. NO YES NO YES NO YES
Only Revolv. × Trend NO YES NO YES NO YES
Prop. Revolv. × Trend NO NO NO NO NO NO
Bal. Dummies × Min. Pay NO YES NO YES NO YES
Delinquency Dummies - - NO YES NO YES
Delinquency × Trend - - NO YES NO YES
Spell Dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Account Characteristics NO YES NO YES NO YES
R2 0.000 0.086 0.025 0.226 0.000 0.347
Observations 24,406,551 21,993,773 3,159,000 2,964,165 3,159,000 2,964,165
Note: This table shows the main regressions when the proportion of revolving balance on the account is measured
as the average over the 6 months period before the start of the orginal sample. Standard errors are corrected for
within account heteroscedasticity. ** and * represent significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 1.10: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy Change
P(Lt+1|Ct) P(Ct+1|Lt) P(Wt+1|Lt)
A. Revolving Balance/1000
After Change × Prop. Revol. × Revol. Balance 0.0038** -0.0064** -0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0005)
After Change × Prop. Revolv. -0.0112** -0.0516** 0.0032**
(0.0012) (0.0040) (0.0010)
After Change × Revol. Balance -0.0028** 0.0039* 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0017) (0.0005)
Prop. Revol. × Revol. Balance 0.0005 0.0063** 0.0009**
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0001)
R2 0.074 0.189 0.358
Observations 23,979,721 3,310,085 3,310,085
B. Revolving Balance/Revolving Credit Limit
After Change × Prop. Revol. × Line Utilization -0.0001 0.0133 0.0073
(0.0035) (0.0360) (0.0058)
After Change × Prop. Revolv. 0.0089** -0.1076** -0.0069
(0.0020) (0.0320) (0.0052)
After Change × Line Utilization 0.0228** 0.0019 -0.0074
(0.0032) (0.0327) (0.0053)
Prop. Revol. × Line Utilization 0.0185** -0.0910** -0.0050**
(0.0021) (0.0092) (0.0012)
R2 0.081 0.195 0.359
Observations 23,979,721 3,310,085 3,310,085
C. External Score/1000
After Change × Prop. Revol. × Ext. Credit Score -0.0411** 0.0325** -0.0241**
(0.0086) (0.0111) (0.0049)
After Change × Prop. Revolv. 0.0217** -0.0651** 0.0153**
(0.0080) (0.0092) (0.0044)
After Change × Ext. Credit Score 0.0910** -0.1177** 0.0268**
(0.0074) (0.0088) (0.0041)
Prop. Revol. × Ext. Credit Score -0.0345** 0.1332** -0.0270**
(0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0009)
R2 0.075 0.191 0.359
Observations 23,979,721 3,310,085 3,310,085
F. Client at Institution? (1=yes, 0=no)
After Change × Prop. Revol. × Client 0.0009 0.0015 -0.0047*
(0.0038) (0.0067) (0.0019)
After Change × Prop. Revolv. 0.0001 -0.0707** 0.0053**
(0.0038) (0.0057) (0.0018)
After Change × Client -0.0093** 0.0085 0.0008
(0.0034) (0.0057) (0.0018)
Prop. Revol. × Client 0.0271** 0.0237** -0.0018*
(0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0008)
R2 0.075 0.189 0.358
Observations 23,979,721 3,310,085 3,310,085
Month F.E. YES YES YES
Only Revolv. YES YES YES
Only Revolv. × Trend YES YES YES
Prop. Revolv. × Trend YES YES YES
Delinquency Dummies - YES YES
Delinquency × Trend - YES YES
Spell Dummies YES YES YES
Total Bal. Dummies × Min. Pay Dummies YES YES YES
Account Characteristics YES YES YES
Note: This table shows the heterogeneous effects of the policy on delinquency transitions estimated from separate probit
regressions using monthly credit card accounts with revolving balances greater than $333 in a 24-month window around the
policy change. The specification follows model (4) in Table 1.3 with added interaction terms. Standard errors are corrected
for within account heteroscedasticity. ** and * represent significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
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Chapter 2
Consumption, Debt, and Delinquency Responses to
an Anticipated Increase in Cash-on-Hand1
Abstract
I analyze the response of consumption, debt, and delinquency to an anticipated increase in
cash-on-hand in the presence of liquidity constraints. I use account-level data from a North
American bank that allows clients to make purchases using credit card and term loans on
the same account. Term loans are paid off in a predetermined number of equal monthly
installments. The end of a term loan therefore generates a predictable increase in cash-on-hand
relative to months in which payments were required. Consistent with a model in which
consumers are potentially liquidity constrained, consumers ex-ante identified as unconstrained
do not increase their credit card expenditures, constrained consumers increase both their credit
card expenditures and balance, and consumers for whom the credit card is the marginal source
of funds decrease their balance. The propensity to take out a new term loan increases for all
consumers, whether constrained or not. About 4% of unconstrained consumers delay taking
out a new term loan until the original loan is repaid, contrary to theoretical predictions. Paying
off the term loan reduces financial delinquency and the probability of default.
JEL Classification: D12, D14, E21, G21.
1I am grateful to my committee members Stephen Shore (chair), Conrad Ciccotello, Georges Dionne and Glenn
Harrison for helpful comments. I also thank seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Florida
International University, Georgia State University, HEC Montre´al, Laval University, Queen’s University, and Utah
State University for their valuable suggestions.
2.1 Introduction
Under the rational-expectation permanent income hypothesis (PIH), agents are averse to
consumption fluctuations so they smooth consumption by borrowing and saving (Modigliani
and Brumberg, 1954; Friedman, 1957). Agents are forward-looking: when cash-on-hand
is expected to rise, they seek to increase consumption early by borrowing against their
future wealth. As a result, the PIH predicts that unconstrained consumers adjust their
consumption-savings decision when anticipating a change in cash-on-hand, not when it is
realized. In the presence of liquidity constraints some consumers cannot borrow against
future wealth. Liquidity constraints generate a correlation between consumption and cash-
on-hand because constrained consumers—who are not able to adjust consumption when
cash-on-hand is expected to increase—respond by increasing consumption once the cash
increase is realized (Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 1997).
Researchers and policy makers have traditionally been interested in the marginal propen-
sity to consume out of income changes because it provides a way to evaluate fiscal policy
that affects income.2 The typical empirical finding shows that consumption is excessively
sensitive to predictable transitory changes in income relative to the theoretical predictions
of the PIH.3 This failure of the PIH has widely been attributed to the presence of liquidity
constraints but, even when they are considered, mixed empirical results persist.4 Liquidity
constraints are hard to identify because they pertain to the consumer’s shadow cost of bor-
rowing. Early tests of liquidity constraints focused on splitting the sample according to net
wealth (Zeldes, 1989) but net wealth might fail to accurately identify financial constraints
(Jappelli, 1990). The use of high-frequency credit card data has gained popularity for the
analysis of liquidity constraints (Gross and Souleles, 2002a; Agarwal et al., 2007) because
2See, for example, Agarwal et al. (2007); Agarwal and Qian (2014); Souleles (1999); Johnson et al. (2006); Hsieh
(2003).
3Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) survey theoretical results on the consumption response to income shocks, and
Attanasion and Weber (2010) and Fuchs-Schuendeln and Hassan (2015) survey empirical results.
4Hsieh (2003) shows that some consumers smooth consumption for large recurring payments but not for smaller,
infrequent ones. Scholnick (2013) provides evidence that consumers are more inclined to smooth large than small
income changes. Browning and Collado (2001) cannot reject the PIH for income changes which occur frequently over
the life cycle. Shea (1995) highlights that liquidity constraints can explain the sensitivity of consumption to income
increases, but not to declines since consumers can save ahead of time.
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maximum authorized limits on credit cards can proxy for credit quantity constraints. How-
ever, the shadow cost of borrowing might differ substantially among quantity unconstrained
consumers, therefore affecting their response to an increase in cash-on-hand.
In this paper, I test predictions of a version of the PIH in which consumers differ in
their shadow cost of funds. I use account-level data from a North American bank that
allows clients to use both a credit card and term loans on the same account. The credit
card is a revolving loan that is paid off on a flexible schedule. Term loans are paid off in a
predetermined number of equal monthly installments. Because the amortization schedule of
the term loan is provided on consumers’ monthly account statement, the end of a term loan
generates a predictable increase in cash-on-hand relative to months in which borrowers were
required to make the monthly payment on the loan. I use this event to provide empirical
evidence on the response of consumption, debt, and delinquency to an anticipated increase
in cash-on-hand.5
I contribute to the literature on empirical tests of the PIH in three ways. First, the
high-frequency nature of the data allows me to better measure who is constrained, in what
way, and to what degree. I extend the typical tests of liquidity constraints by considering
the shadow cost of funds faced by borrowers, as implied by their payment behavior on the
credit card. Borrowers are categorized as full, partial, or minimum payers depending on
their history of payment behavior. I show that the groups of partial and full payers are both
unconstrained in the quantity of credit available, while minimum payers appear constrained.
The important difference among unconstrained borrowers is that partial payers revolve a
large fraction of their monthly balance (and therefore pay a median APR of 19,9%) whereas
full payers are charged no interest.
Second, I measure the consumption response using two different channels: credit card
and term loan expenditures. In addition, the data allow me to distinguish between two
5This is not the first paper using a reduction in loan payments to learn about the effect of anticipated increases in
cash-on-hand: Coulibaly and Li (2006) and Scholnick (2013) use last mortgage payments and Stephens (2008) uses
last auto loan payments. However, except for Scholnick (2013) — who strictly focuses on the “magnitude hypothesis”
— these articles use low-frequency survey data such as the Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX), without the
detailed loan performance information provided by bank-level data such as those used in this paper and which allow
me to study financial delinquency.
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types of term loans. Bank-originated term loans are contracted with a bank representative
and can be used for different (unobservable to the econometrician) purposes by borrowers
(e.g. home renovations, car financing, investments). Store-originated term loans, which are
contracted at select retail stores, are recorded separately and are solely used to finance “big-
ticket” items over monthly installments. Store loans therefore provide a measure of durable
consumption—a dimension usually ignored by research using only credit card data.
Third, the credit card and the term loans are linked to the same account, which allows
me to quantify the impact of an increase in cash on financial delinquency. Because debt
contracts feature limited commitment from the borrower, the possibility of being financially
delinquent on one’s obligation represents an important margin of adjustment for consumers.
The average results show that total payments made on the account decrease following
the predetermined pay-off of the term loan. However, the decline in payments induced by
the end of the term loan is attenuated by an increase in payments made on the credit card.
Spending on the credit card increases almost one-for-one with increased payments, leaving
credit card balances nearly unchanged. I estimate an average marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) out of reduced debt payments of 9% each month on the credit card. In addition, the
propensity to take out new term loans increases by about 35% after the original term loan
is repaid (an increase of 0.84 percentage points on a baseline of 2.4%). This suggests that
previous research using only credit card data might underestimate the MPC by omitting
other channels for the consumption response.6
These average effects differ for borrowers ex ante identified as differently constrained.
Consumers with a history of paying their credit card balance in full do not change their
credit card expenditures. Constrained consumers, with a history of making minimum credit
card payments, increase their credit card expenditures and revolving balance. Consumers
for whom the credit card is the marginal source of funds, with a history of paying their
balance partially, decrease their revolving balance.7 Surprisingly, although the behavior of
6Gross and Souleles (2002a) estimate an MPC out of increased credit card limits of 10-14% which is close to what
I find on the credit card without considering the term loan response.
7These results are in line with Mian et al. (2013), Di Maggio et al. (2015), and Keys et al. (2014), who find that the
most indebted households choose to deleverage instead of increasing consumption in response to increased liquidity.
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consumers on the credit card account is in accordance with a model in which consumers are
potentially liquidity constrained, the propensity to take out a new term loan increases for all
consumers, whether constrained or not. About 4% of unconstrained consumers delay taking
out a new store-originated term loan until the original loan is repaid, contrary to theoretical
predictions. Such behavior is consistent with borrowers having different mental accounts
from which they finance consumption and, in particular, is consistent with some consumers
self-imposing themselves limits on the amount of active term loans they can have at once. In
the words of Thaler (1990): “there are two important sources of liquidity constraints: those
imposed by capital markets, and those imposed by individuals on themselves.”
The probability of missing a payment on the account is reduced after the term loan is
repaid, with the greatest effect found among constrained borrowers. This leads to a decrease
in the probability of consumer default (i.e. reaching six-months overdue on the account).
These results highlight the trade-off for the bank between granting an additional dollar of
term loan debt and increasing the probability of taking a loss on an unproductive loan.
Because the term loans can be prepaid without penalty, one methodological concern
is that unobservable variables (e.g. windfall gains) might correlate with the prepayment
decision and outcomes studied in the analysis. For this reason, I use the anticipated date
of final payment — predicted 12 months before its realization — as the event generating an
increase in cash-on-hand. In such intention-to-treat (ITT) approach (e.g. Imbens and Rudin,
2015), random assignment into the treatment is assumed for the predicted final payment date,
not its actual realization. This mitigates concerns about unobservable variables correlating
with the final term loan payment and subsequent consumption behavior, while still capturing
a discontinuous decrease in monthly debt payments. The results are robust to modeling the
term loan prepayment decision in a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979), where the
identifying assumption is that the interest rate on the term loan affects the probability of
prepayment but not subsequent consumption decisions. As additional robustness checks, I
perform the analysis on the subsample of borrowers who comply exactly with the predicted
final payment date (perfect-compliance analysis) and I use the actual final payment date as
the event generating the increase in cash-on-hand (as-treated analysis).
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2.2 Conceptual Framework
Theoretically, liquidity constraints refer to the inability to borrow against future wealth
(Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 1997). This strict definition of liquidity constraints refers to a con-
straint on the quantity of funds that can be borrowed. Empirically, net wealth (Zeldes,
1989) and survey responses from borrowers that have been refused for loans (Jappelli, 1990)
have been used as proxies for liquidity constraints. Recently, the “head-room” available on
a credit card account or, conversely, the percentage of the maximum authorized credit limit
drawn down, has gained popularity as a proxy for quantity constraints (Gross and Souleles,
2002a; Agarwal et al., 2007). However, as noted by Gross and Souleles (2002a), a weaker
definition of liquidity constraints refers to the wedge between the lending and borrowing
rate faced by consumers. A bigger wedge between the cost of funds and the interest rate
on savings represents tighter liquidity constraints. Under this weaker definition of liquidity
constraints, borrowers who are unconstrained in the quantity of credit available are allowed
to differ in the marginal cost of funds they pay to finance consumption.
A borrower’s cost of funds is difficult to measure. However, if borrowers are making opti-
mal consumption and savings decisions, it can be bounded by observing their borrowing and
payment behavior. Because credit cards are revolving loans, borrowers choose the fraction
of their balance they repay each month. The payments made on a credit card therefore pro-
vide information about the interest rate which consumers are paying to fund consumption,
and the amount borrowed at that rate. Using past payment behavior on the credit card, I
classify borrowers into three levels of liquidity constraints described below and summarized
in Table 2.1.
Full Payer. — Consumers who repay their revolving balance in full at the end of the
month are not charged any interest fees. These borrowers are not willing to revolve debt at
the interest rate offered on the card; they have an outside cost of fund that is smaller than the
APR on the card. These consumers are not considered constrained. When anticipating an
increase in cash-on-hand, their margin of adjustment is not to increase consumption (because
they could already have done so), but rather to save the additional money at the interest
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Table 2.1: Liquidity Constraints and Credit Card Payment Behavior
Outside Empirical Predictions
Cost of Funds C.C. Purchases Term Purchases C.C. Debt
Full Payer R < APR No Changes No Changes No Changes
Partial Payer R = APR No Changes No Changes Decrease
Minimum Payer R > APR Increase Increase Increase
rate available on their savings account.
Minimum Payer. — Borrowers who bunch around minimum monthly payments are
making the minimum dollar amount required in order to avoid delinquency. Such borrowers
are revolving almost their entire end-of-the-month balance at the APR on the card. For these
borrowers, the outside cost of fund is larger than the APR on the card and, if they could,
they would potentially increase the amount of debt revolved on the card. Such borrowers are
the most likely to be constrained, and in response to extra cash-on-hand we would expect
them to increase consumption (through either credit card or new term loan expenditures).
Because they are paying a small portion of their balance each month, the extra cash-on-hand
could even be used to finance a higher amount of credit card debt.
Partial Payer. — Finally, some borrowers fall in between the full and minimum payers:
they repay part of their balance, and revolve part of it. These borrowers use the credit
card as their marginal source of borrowing. They could increase consumption by revolving
an additional amount of debt on the credit card instead of paying it off. They are at an
interior solution with respect to the amount borrowed on the card and have an outside cost
of fund that is exactly equal to the APR on the card. Therefore, their margin of adjustment
when receiving extra cash-on-and is not to increase consumption, but rather to reduce their
revolving balance.
These empirical predictions are summarized in Table 2.1. Appendix Table 2.12 tabulates
the interaction between the typical measure of quantity constraints (in terms of the utilization
rate out of the credit card limit) and the measure of payment behavior proposed in this
46
analysis. Interestingly, virtually every consumer that pays the balance partially or fully is
also considered unconstrained in terms of the quantity of funds available to draw down.
Consumers identified as paying the minimum amount fall in two groups: one group is both
constrained in terms of quantity and cost of funds, while the other is only constrained in
terms of cost of funds. The conceptual framework proposed in this paper can therefore be
seen as augmenting the traditional binary view of liquidity constraints as binding or not, by
separating the behavior of consumers for whom quantity constraints do not bind in terms
of their outside cost of funds. The results highlight that, even for borrowers unconstrained
in quantity, the consumption response to anticipated increase in cash-on-hand might differ
depending on the outside cost of funds.
2.3 Data and Research Design
I use account-level data provided by a large North American bank. Borrowers can use their
account to make purchases with both a credit card and term loans. All accounts are originally
linked to a credit card and borrowers can then choose to use the account to contract term
loans. There is no penalty for prepaying either loan. The credit card is a typical revolving
loan: borrowers use it to make purchases and pay interest only on the portion of the balance
that is unpaid after a billing cycle. It has no fixed repayment schedule other than a minimum
monthly payment equal to a small portion of the monthly balance.8 Term loans are repaid
in equal monthly installments over 12, 24, 36, 48 or 60 months. Two types of term loans
are offered by the bank: the bank-originated term loans are contracted at the bank, whereas
the store-originated terms loans are contracted at selected retail stores as a way of financing
consumer goods over monthly installments. Accounts have separate borrowing limits for
term and revolving loans. The bank advertises that taking out a term loan does not affect
the credit card limit and vice versa.
The data made available by the bank include monthly information typically found on
8The bank increased the minimum revolving payment from 3% to 5% of the monthly credit card balance during
the time frame analyzed in this study, see d’Astous and Shore (2015). However, because the date of the final term
loan payment varies across borrowers and because I control for time fixed effects, this does not affect the results.
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the front page of credit card statements such as total spending, total payments, balance
outstanding, interest rate, and delinquency. Data also include demographics such as sex,
age, credit score and partial information about zip code.9
Figure 2.1 presents a typical monthly statement. The total account balance is the sum of
the term and revolving balances and, equivalently, purchases and payments can be analyzed
on each type of loan or aggregated at the account level. The total minimum payment due is
the sum of; a) the minimum payment on the revolving balance, b) the installment payment
on the term balance, and c) any overdue amount from previously missed payments. For
delinquent borrowers, paying this sum “cures” (makes current) the account. Borrowers who
pay less than this sum miss a payment and increase their delinquency cycle by one. Accounts
can be current, or 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 cycles delinquent. Accounts that are six cycles delinquent
are considered to be in default and must be written off.10 There is no distinction between
delinquency on the revolving and term loans; delinquency is recorded at the account level.
Each month, an account can transition into one of three mutually exclusive delinquency
states: current, delinquent, and written-off. The write-off state is absorbing and arises from
either default or bankruptcy.
9The data do not explicitly distinguish between payments made on term and revolving loans. I back out this
information using the evolution of the balances and spending. Term loan prepayment occurs when the term balance
goes down by an amount greater than the monthly installment. The monthly term loan installment plus the prepay-
ment amount is the monthly term loan payment. Total payments net of term loan payments is the payment made
towards the revolving balance.
The interest rate and amortization schedule are missing for the term loans. I calculate this information using the
monthly installment — which is given — and the evolution of the term balances. Specifically, I first use the variation
in balance on the term loan to back out the interest charged on the account as
i =
Installmentt −∆Balancet
Balancet−1
.
Using this rate, I calculate the number of months left before the term loan is repaid as
n =
log
(
Installment
(Installment−∆Blancet) × i
)
log (1 + i)
.
10The number of cycles delinquent depends on the payment history, not merely on the number of calendar months
the account has been delinquent. Accounts move forward in delinquency cycles (e.g., from 1 cycle delinquent to 2
cycles) when the total payment falls below the sum of (a) and (b) above; accounts can improve in delinquency cycles
without curing if a portion of the overdue amount (c) is paid.
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Figure 2.1: Account Statement Example
Account Statement 
Statement Date: 02-12-2014 Due Date: 03-10-2014 Account Number: XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX 
John Smith 
123 Street 
Townsville 
North America 
Total Minimum Payment Due: 
 
$ 81.49 
Amount Paid: 
$ ___________________ 
(this amount  will be applied to you current balance) 
Account Summary: 
Previous Balance      $1,500 
 
Purchases and Adjustments  + $1,000 
Cash Advances  + $0 
Interest Charges  + $0 
Monthly Term loan Installment + $31.49 
Payments and other Credits  -  $1,500 
 
Current Balance  = $1,031.49 
Credit Card Limit:   5,000 
Credit Card Available:   4,000 
Annual Percentage Rate (APR):  19.90% 
Total Minimum  
Payment Due: 
Minimum Payment on 
Revolving  Balance 
Monthly Payment on 
the Term Loan 
Overdue  Amount 
$ 50 $ 31.49 $ 0 
Total Minimum 
Payment Due 
$ 81.49 + + = 
Information concerning total 
account balance: 
Current Balance Term Loan Balance 
$ 1,031.49 $ 552.36 
Total Account 
Balance 
$1,583.85  + = 
Term loan information 
Previous Balance on 
the Term Loan 
Variation in the 
Principal Amount 
$ 580.44 $ 0 
New Balance on 
the Term Loan 
$ 552.36 = 
Principal Interest Total 
Detailed Current Payment 
$ 28.08 $ 3.41 $ 31.49 
$ 31.49 
     $ 3.41 
+ $ 548.95 
Note: This figure shows a typical account statement for a borrower at the bank. The monthly statement presents infor-
mation about the revolving and term loans on the account. The total minimum payment due consists of the minimum
payment on the credit card balance, the monthly term loan payment, and the overdue amount. The monthly payment on
the term loan consists of the installment due on the term loan in the current month. The overdue amount consists of the
cumulative amount that arises from paying less than the total minimum payment due on previous statements.
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2.3.1 Sample Construction
The original data consist of monthly observations on the universe of the bank’s credit card
accounts — close to 5 million unique accounts — over the period ranging from December
2009 to May 2013. A total of 2, 649, 863 accounts have an active term loan at some point in
the sample.
I use an event-study methodology with an intention-to-treat (ITT) approach. The month
of final term loan payment is predicted one year before its realization and the behavior of
borrowers is then analyzed in the months prior to and following the predicted final term loan
payment. This has the advantage of preventing unobservable variables to correlate directly
with the outcomes of interest in the month of actual term loan paydown, particularly in
the case of prepayment. For example, using the actual last payment month could bias
the results if unobservable variables affect both the decision to prepay and the subsequent
consumption-savings decision. In this ITT framework, the random assignment assumption is
on the predicted date of final payment, rather than on its actual date. This methodology has
the advantage of capturing the anticipation of a change in cash-on-hand, which is consistent
with the theoretical implications tested. It also allows me to analyze term loan prepayment
and new term loan expenditures in the period before the final term loan payment.11
Figure 2.2 shows the timeline of the event-study. I require borrowers to conform to the
term loan payment schedule during the period 12 months to 9 months before the anticipated
final payment. I also require that borrowers have only one active term loan during this
selection period, to rule out the possibility that a consumer is identified as paying off a
term loan although a second one is still active in the account.12 Time 0 corresponds to the
first month in which the borrower is anticipated to have paid down the term loan. Control
variables and measures of financial constraints are calculated during the sample-selection
period — before the event study starts — in order to avoid confounding the impact of term
loan repayment with any of the outcomes studied.
11Focusing solely on borrowers who follow the term loan’s exact repayment schedule would also be problematic
as it might introduce a selection bias towards more financially constrained borrowers — who are not able to take
advantage of the option to prepay. I present the results for such an extension in Section 2.5.
12However, during the event study borrowers can have two types of term loans (merchant and bank loans) simul-
taneously, in which case I aggregate them to a single term loan.
50
Figure 2.2: Event Study Timeline
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Anticipated date of last term loan payment as of t-9 
To be included in the sample, accounts must have an anticipated term loan repayment
event and have observations over the full event-study period. Accounts that default prior to
the end of the sample period are nevertheless allowed in the sample. As a result, 1, 225, 965
events of term loan repayment are observed in the data. Following the sample selection
described above yields 291, 777 unique accounts and 4, 803, 365 account-month observations.
Compliance with Anticipated Last Payment Date
Because of the nature of the research design, I provide evidence of compliance with the
predicted date of last term payment. Panel (a) of Figure 2.3 shows the fraction of borrowers
paying down their term loan each month (that is, bringing the term loan balance to zero).
Time 0 corresponds to the first month in which the borrower is predicted to have paid down
the term loan. 46% of accounts-holders finish paying their term loan in month 0 of the event
study, exactly as predicted one year before the event. The rest of the account-holders finish
paying their term loans in the months surrounding t = 0. Panel (b) shows the monthly
term loan installment for the full sample, and for groups of borrowers who do not prepay
and who do not take out new term loans before the original one is repaid. There is a
discontinuous decrease in term loan installment in the month of the predicted final payment.
Installments do not go down to zero because some borrowers take out new term loans before
the original term is repaid, which dampens the reduction in monthly required payments.
This nevertheless provides the source of variation in cash-on-hand used in the analysis.
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Figure 2.3: Compliance with Predicted Last Payment
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Note: Panel (a) shows the fraction of borrowers paying off their term loan (i.e. bringing the term balance to zero) each
month. Panel (b) shows the monthly term loan installment for the full sample and for groups of borrowers who do not
prepay and who do not take out new term loans before the original one is repaid. Time 0 corresponds to the first month
in which the borrower is predicted to have paid down the term loan.
52
2.3.2 Identification Strategy
To analyze the response of consumers to an increase in cash-on-hand, one needs to determine
appropriate treated and control groups. A natural way to proceed is to compare borrowers
who experience a final term loan payment with those who do not. To compare groups of
borrowers who are as homogeneous as possible, I compare borrowers who have active term
loans, but who face an anticipated term loan paydown at different point in time. Because
borrowers finish repaying their term loans in different months, there is variation in the timing
of the increased cash-on-hand which allows me to average out seasonal effects.
The baseline analysis exploits the time variation of the anticipated final payment across
borrowers in an equation of the form
Yi,t = βAfter?i,t + Controlsi,t + λt + εi,t, (2.1)
where Yi,t represents outcomes such as spending (using the credit card or term loans), debt
payments, debt levels and delinquency events.13 After?i,t is a dummy variable equal to one
if the observation is after the anticipated final term payment date, and 0 otherwise. The
control variables are taken in the four months period prior to the start of the event study
and consist of monthly term loan installment, external credit score, revolving limit on the
account, APR on the revolving loan, age of the account, age of the account-holder, average
credit card and term loan balances and average monthly purchases. Month fixed effects and
a quadratic trend in event-study time are included in all specifications.
To measure the consumer response as a fraction of the dollar amount of debt payment
reduction, I augment the baseline specification by interacting the dummy variable indicating
the predicted final payment date with the dollar amount of monthly term loan installment.
13The equations presented in this section represent the versions that are estimated by OLS. However, because
expenditures feature an excess realization of zeros, I also estimate two-part models where the zero realizations and
the conditional distribution of positive expenditures are modeled separately. In such cases, each equation is then
estimated with a Probit model and a truncated-normal model. Probit models are also estimated when modeling the
probability of financial delinquency.
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I estimate a regression equation of the form
Yi,t = β1After?i,t ×Di + β2After?i,t + β3Di + λt + Controlsi,t + εi,t, (2.2)
where Di is the monthly installment on the term loan calculated in the period before the
event study starts. β1 gives the average monthly response in dollars to a reduction of the
term loan installment of $1. This coefficient therefore measures the marginal propensity to
consume out of a reduction in committed debt payments when the outcome of interest is
consumption.
Because financial constraints may explain the failure of the permanent income hypothesis,
I estimate their effects by interacting the payment behavior outlined in Section 2.2 with the
dummy variable indicating the predicted final payment date. In such case, I estimate a
model of the form
Yi,t = β1After?i,t ×Min Payeri + β2After?i,t ×Med Payeri + β3 × After?i,t
+ β4 ×Min Payeri + β5Med Payeri + λt + Controlsi,t + εi,t, (2.3)
where “Min Payer” and “Med Payer” are dummy variables identifying borrowers by their
payment behavior in the four months prior to the start of the event-study, and with the
“Full Payer” category being omitted and therefore absorbed in the “After?” coefficient.
This equation is also augmented by interacting the dollar amount of monthly installment D,
as is the case in equation (2.2)
The identification strategy assumes that consumers rationally anticipate the ending of
the term loan. As this information is provided on their monthly statement, there is no
reason to believe that they do not systematically do so. The main threat to identification
is that unobservable variables correlate with prepayment and subsequent consumption, debt
or, delinquency patterns. To address this concern, in Section 2.5 I extend the analysis to take
into account the decision to prepay the term loan. I exploit the fact that some term loans
are offered at 0% APR to provide the exclusion restriction required to model prepayment
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in a Heckman selection model. The identifying assumption is that having a 0% APR on
the term loan affects the probability of prepaying the loan without otherwise affecting the
consumption and debt repayment decisions.
2.4 Main Results
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. All statistics
are presented for the full sample, and broken down by periods before and after the predicted
final term loan payment. Panel A shows borrower demographics. Panel B shows purchases,
payments and balances aggregated at the total account level. The total account variables
are the sum of the activity on the credit card and term loans, which are presented separately
in Panels C and D.
Panel D shows that the monthly installment due on the term loan goes down by $64 after
the anticipated final payment date, from an initial amount of $102. It does not go exactly
to zero because some borrowers take out new loans or prepay during the event study. The
reduction in term loan installment drives the total account payments down by $32 and the
revolving payments increase by the difference: $64− $32 = $32. This provides preliminary
evidence that borrowers are shifting payments towards the revolving account after paying
down the term loan. Total purchases on the account go up by $44, out of which $32 come
from an increase in revolving purchases and $12 from an increase in term loans. The size of
new term loans is similar before and after the event date, which suggests that the increase
in term loan purchases is driven by an increase in the extensive margin (i.e., the propensity
to take out a new term loan).
The average APR on the credit card is 18% while it is 4% for term loans. This very small
interest rate on term loans is driven by some of the loans taken out at retail store being
offered at 0% APR financing. The external credit score is a bankruptcy prediction score
and varies from 1 to 1, 000. Unlike FICO scores, which predict the probability of missing a
payment on a loan, this type of measure predicts the probability of filing for bankruptcy over
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the next two years and is typically higher than average FICO scores. There is evidence that
credit quality, as measured by an external agency, increases after the term loan is repaid,
although this could be spurious evidence that credit rating agencies update their credit scores
to consumers’ debt levels.
Sample Selection
Two types of sample selection are worth investigating: selection into getting a term loan, and
selection into the type of term loan contracted. Table 2.13 first shows descriptive statistics
for accounts included in the event-study, and a 10% random sample of accounts that never
have a term loan in the original dataset.14 The credit card balance is similar for both group,
with a difference of only $35. However, borrowers with a term loan have a smaller credit
card limit, which is compensated by a higher term loan limit. The external credit scores are
similar and do not provide evidence that any group is of significantly better or worse credit
quality.
Table 2.14 shows descriptive statistics for groups of borrowers that originally had a store-
originated or a bank-originated term loan. Borrowers with a store-originated term loan
have smaller credit card and term loan balances. They are also making smaller monthly
payments. They have higher credit card and term loan limits and a better external score.
In Section 2.4.3, the main results presented below are also segmented by the type of loan
borrowers originally held.
2.4.2 Average Effects
Expenditures, Payments, and Debt Levels
Figure 2.4 presents preliminary evidence of the average response to the anticipated final
term loan payment over the period of the event study. Panel (a) shows total payments made
on the account, and payments made on the credit card and term loans separately. There is
evidence of substitution of payments from the term loan to the credit card: as the term loans
14The descriptive statistics are calculated as the average over the four months pre-event study for borrowers with
a term loan and as the first four months available in the sample for borrowers with no term loans.
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are paid off, borrowers use part of the previous monthly installment towards the credit card.
Panel (b) shows total expenditures on the account, and expenditures on the credit card and
on new term loans separately. There is no obvious discontinuity in credit card purchases
around the final payment month. However, new term loan expenditures exhibit a transitory
increase around the month of the final payment, followed by a small permanent increase.
Panel (c) shows the fraction of borrowers taking out new term loans in each months of
the event study, broken down by bank-originated and store-originated loans. The transitory
increase in new term loan expenditures is confined to new bank loans and the permanent level
increase to new store loans. These patterns are further explored in Section 2.4.4. Finally,
Panel (d) shows the evolution of credit card and term loan balances. The credit card balance
is relatively stable over the event study. Note that term loan balance represents the sum of
all active term loans on the account. It decreases in the months before the final payment
and increases after, as some consumers take out new term loans.
Table 2.3 quantifies these effects by estimating equation (2.1). The outcomes analyzed
are new expenditures, payments, and changes in balances. They are presented aggregated
at the account level as well as segmented by credit card and term loans. The effect on the
total account is the sum of the effect on each type of loans, and the changes in balances
result from differences in expenditures and payments — up to differences due to interests
and fees charged on the account. The specification presented includes months fixed effects,
a quadratic trend in event-study time, as well as a set of account characteristics.
The results show that payments made towards the term loan account decline by $51
after the final term loan payment, in line with the reduced installment payments. At the
same time, payments made on the revolving account increase by $8, which drives the total
payments made on the account down by $43. Part of the reduction in term loan monthly
payments is therefore passed through to an increase in credit card payments.
Total purchases on the account increase by $30 and can be traced back to an increase
in revolving expenditure of $6 and an increase in term loan expenditures of $24.15 The
15The results of estimating an OLS model on expenditures is presented in column (1) of Table 2.3. Because
there is an excess realization of months with no new expenditures (specially for term loans), I also decompose
total expenditures by estimating a two-part model in columns (2) and (3): I present the marginal effects for the
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Table 2.3: Average Effects
Purchases Payments ∆ Balance
(1)
In Dollars
(2)
P(New Purchases)
(3)
Purchases | > 0
(4)
In Dollars
(5)
In Dollars
A. Total Account
After? 30.4407*** 0.0149*** 52.7924*** -43.1718*** 62.7994***
(1.6441) (0.0006) (3.7965) (1.4307) (2.0528)
R2 0.397 0.308 0.338 0.449 0.003
Observations 4,803,365 4,803,365 2,053,541 4,803,365 4,787,607
B. Revolving Loan
After? 6.0724*** 0.0109*** 4.3564 7.7700*** -3.4339***
(1.1637) (0.0006) (2.7614) (1.4126) (1.2742)
R2 0.518 0.319 0.473 0.438 0.001
Observations 4,803,365 4,803,365 2,008,154 4,803,365 4,787,607
C. Term Loan
After? 24.3683*** 0.0084*** 44.0295 -50.9419*** 66.2333***
(1.1427) (0.0003) (38.0151) (0.2736) (1.6771)
R2 0.004 0.013 0.082 0.204 0.006
Observations 4,803,365 4,803,365 106,158 4,803,365 4,787,607
Month F.E. YES YES YES YES YES
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES YES YES
Account Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table shows the results of estimating equation (2.1) by OLS for all columns except for column (2) which is es-
timated using a Probit model and for which I report the marginal effects. The control variables grouped under “Account
Characteristics” are taken in the four months period prior to the start of the event study and consist of monthly term loan
installment, external credit score, revolving limit on the account, age of the account, age of the account-holder, average
credit card and term loan balances, average monthly purchases and a dummy variable indicating if the borrower pays for
a reduced APR on the credit card. Standard errors corrected for within-account heteroscedasticity are presented in paren-
theses. ***, ***, and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
increase in credit card purchases comes from an increase in the probability of using the card
of 1 percentage points (2.8% increase on a baseline of 39.3%). The size of the average term
loan taken out does not change: the increase in term loan expenditures is driven solely by
an increase of 0.84 percentage point in the probability of taking out a new term loan (35%
increase on a baseline of 2.4%). For this reason, the right measure of consumption response
through term loan expenditures is the propensity of consumers to take out new term loans.
The simultaneous increase of spending and payments made with the credit card leaves the
revolving balance nearly unchanged. Term and total account balances increase as borrowers
take out new term loans.
probability of making a purchase estimated by a Probit equation and the results of estimating a truncated-normal
model on expenditures conditional on them being positive.
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Marginal Propensity to Consume
Table 2.4 measures the credit card response as a fraction of the reduction in monthly install-
ment by estimating equation (2.2). In this specification, the effect measured is the marginal
propensity to consume out of reduced term loan payments. Panel A interacts the dummy
variable “After?” with the dollar amount of term loan installment D. The consumption re-
sponse through the credit card is on average 9%. This is in-line with previous research using
credit card expenditures to measure the MPC.16 An increase in payments almost perfectly
offsets the increase in new expenditures, leading to a decrease in average credit card balance
of 2% of the monthly installment each month. Panel B investigates the effect of the size
of monthly payment reduction. To this end, the dollar amount of term loan installment is
segmented in bins of [$0-$75], [$75-$150], [$150-$250], [$250+]. Dummy variables are con-
structed for each categories (D1 to D4), with the lowest category being omitted. The results
show that the consumption response increases in the amount of reduced debt installments.17
2.4.3 Liquidity Constraints
In this section, I test the empirical predictions derived in Section 2.2. Consumers repaying
their balance fully are not constrained and should not react to the final payment on the term
loan. On the other hand, consumers repaying minimum monthly amounts on their credit
card account are most likely to be constrained, and are expected to increase consumption
once the original term loan is repaid as this frees up cash-on-hand. Borrowers for whom the
credit card provides the marginal source of funds (i.e., those who are paying part of their
balance, and revolving part of it) are expected to use the amount of monthly installment
freed up to reduce the revolving balance.
16For example, Gross and Souleles (2002a) estimate an MPC out of increased credit card limits of 10-14%.
17This also provides a test of the magnitude hypothesis (e.g. Scholnick, 2013). Proponents of this hypothesis argue
that, due to bounded rationality, individuals do not smooth out small variations in anticipated income changes, but
might smooth out larger changes (Browning and Collado, 2001). The prediction is that larger changes in cash-on-hand
should therefore not affect consumption. The results do not provide evidence of such behavior in this context.
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Table 2.4: Credit Card Response: MPC, Payments, and Balance
Expenditures Payments ∆ Balance
(1) (2) (3)
A. Monthly Installment Linear
After? × D 0.0904*** 0.0933*** -0.0216***
(0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0075)
After? -5.0606*** -3.6928* -0.8274
(1.8739) (2.0417) (1.4575)
D -2.0714*** -1.9024*** 0.0225*
(0.1783) (0.1724) (0.0130)
R2 0.521 0.440 0.001
Observations 4,803,365 4,803,365 4,787,607
B. Monthly Installment in Bins
After? -0.4492 1.0061 -0.8237
(1.3381) (1.5716) (1.3263)
After? × D2? 5.6435*** 5.3612*** -2.7694***
(1.4716) (1.5994) (1.0533)
After? × D3? 13.1407*** 13.2637*** -4.6520***
(2.0722) (2.2774) (1.4683)
After? × D4? 28.1578*** 31.6555*** -10.4687***
(3.5532) (3.8905) (2.4224)
R2 0.518 0.438 0.001
Observations 4,803,365 4,803,365 4,787,607
Month F.E. YES YES YES
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES
Baselines YES YES YES
Account Controls YES YES YES
Note: This table shows the results of estimating equation (2.2). Panel A uses the linear monthly installment on the term
loan (D) and Panel B uses dummy variables for bins of the monthly installment. The control variables grouped under
“Account Characteristics” are taken in the four months period prior to the start of the event study and consist of monthly
term loan installment, external credit score, revolving limit on the account, age of the account, age of the account-holder,
average credit card and term loan balances, average monthly purchases and a dummy variable indicating if the borrower
pays for a reduced APR on the credit card. Standard errors corrected for within-account heteroscedasticity are presented
in parentheses. ***, ***, and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Effect of Liquidity Constraints
Purchases Payments ∆ Balance
(1)
In Dollars
(2)
P(New Purchases)
(3)
Purchases | > 0
(4)
In Dollars
(5)
In Dollars
A. Total Account
After? × Min. Payer 39.3492*** 0.0549*** 29.3714*** 26.1168*** 14.3565***
(2.2346) (0.0010) (4.8501) (2.0135) (2.2792)
After? × Med. Payer -5.9463** 0.0021** -30.5004*** 28.5261*** -32.8437***
(2.6083) (0.0010) (5.0162) (2.2607) (2.3869)
After? 22.0399*** -0.0032*** 49.7534*** -55.9532*** 64.7616***
(2.0743) (0.0008) (4.7041) (1.8245) (2.3375)
R2 0.395 0.296 0.344 0.442 0.003
Observations 4,248,783 4,248,783 2,030,437 4,248,783 4,233,301
B. Revolving Loan
After? × Min. Payer 33.8394*** 0.0554*** 36.7917*** 15.5579*** 14.5100***
(1.6797) (0.0010) (3.8777) (1.9634) (1.4598)
After? × Med. Payer -1.1563 0.0035*** -14.5635*** 12.4856*** -16.5821***
(2.0976) (0.0010) (4.1945) (2.2057) (1.2992)
After? -2.7823* -0.0076*** -2.3772 1.2043 -3.6640**
(1.5978) (0.0007) (3.7889) (1.7941) (1.4310)
R2 0.514 0.305 0.475 0.432 0.002
Observations 4,248,783 4,248,783 1,993,042 4,248,783 4,233,301
C. Term Loan
After? × Min. Payer 5.5098*** 0.0008** 40.2010 10.5589*** -0.1535
(1.4239) (0.0003) (50.1103) (0.5127) (1.8915)
After? × Med. Payer -4.7900*** -0.0023*** -126.2760*** 16.0405*** -16.2617***
(1.4681) (0.0004) (48.0345) (0.5657) (2.0251)
After? 24.8222*** 0.0089*** 55.1804 -57.1575*** 68.4256***
(1.3012) (0.0003) (44.1570) (0.3830) (1.9120)
R2 0.004 0.013 0.080 0.194 0.005
Observations 4,248,783 4,248,783 97,441 4,248,783 4,233,301
Month F.E. YES YES YES YES YES
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES YES YES
Account Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Interactions YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table shows the results of estimating equation (2.2) by OLS for all columns except for column (2) which is estimated us-
ing a Probit model and for which I report the marginal effects. All baselines are included in the estimation but are omitted from
the result table. The control variables grouped under “Account Characteristics” are taken in the four months period prior to the
start of the event study and consist of monthly term loan installment, external credit score, revolving limit on the account, age
of the account, age of the account-holder, average credit card and term loan balances, average monthly purchases and a dummy
variable indicating if the borrower pays for a reduced APR on the credit card. Standard errors corrected for within-account het-
eroscedasticity are presented in parentheses. ***, ***, and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Expenditures, Payments, Debt, and Liquidity Constraints
Figures 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 show the response of payments, expenditures and debt levels seg-
mented by groups of constrained borrowers. Table 2.5 quantifies these results by estimating
equation (2.3) on these outcomes. The results show that unconstrained borrowers do not
change their spending behavior on the card, nor their payments. On the other hand, mini-
mum payers increase their credit card expenditures by $33 with an increase in payments of
only $16. This leads to a monthly increase in credit card balances of $15. Consumers who
were repaying their balance partially do not change their credit card expenditures, but they
use part of the reduction in monthly installment to increase the payments made toward the
credit card balance by $12, reducing their credit card balance by about $17 each month.
These results are in line with the predictions of a model in which borrowers behave accord-
ing to the permanent income hypothesis and in which some of them have liquidity constraints
as measured by their outside cost of funds. Importantly, in terms of quantity constraints, the
groups of borrowers paying their balance in full and partially are not considered constrained
(see Table 2.12). However, the results highlight that even within groups of consumers who
are not quantity constrained, the outside cost of funds affects their consumption-savings
behavior: borrowers with a higher cost of funds choose to pay down their debt.
The term loan response is homogeneous across groups of constrained borrowers — a
surprising fact. All groups of borrowers see an increase in term loan expenditures ranging
from $20 to $30, with the most constrained borrowers increasing them the most. This
average increase in term loan expenditures is driven by an increase in the propensity to take
out new term loans, not in the amount of the loan taken out. It is surprising that even
non-constrained borrowers increase their term loan expenditures after paying off the first
term loan. This is investigated in details in Section 2.4.4.
Marginal Propensity to Consume and Liquidity Constraints
Table 2.6 measures the credit card response as a fraction of the reduction in monthly in-
stallment, and segmented across categories of liquidity constraints. In this specification, the
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Table 2.6: Credit Card Response: Liquidity Constraints
Expenditures Payments ∆ Balance
(1) (2) (3)
After? × D × Min. Payer 0.0849*** 0.0713* -0.0105
(0.0318) (0.0378) (0.0240)
After? × D × Med. Payer 0.0252 0.0593* -0.0368**
(0.0347) (0.0335) (0.0179)
After? × D 0.0627*** 0.0583*** -0.0084
(0.0217) (0.0214) (0.0090)
R2 0.517 0.434 0.002
Observations 4,248,783 4,248,783 4,233,301
Month F.E. YES YES YES
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES
Account Controls YES YES YES
Interactions YES YES YES
Note: This table shows the results of estimating equation (2.2) augmented with the interaction of the monthly installment D.
All interactions and baselines are included in the estimation but are omitted from the result table. The control variables
grouped under “Account Characteristics” are taken in the four months period prior to the start of the event study and con-
sist of monthly term loan installment, external credit score, revolving limit on the account, age of the account, age of the
account-holder, average credit card and term loan balances, average monthly purchases and a dummy variable indicating
if the borrower pays for a reduced APR on the credit card. Standard errors corrected for within-account heteroscedasticity
are presented in parentheses. ***, ***, and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
results measure the marginal propensity to consume out of reduced term loan payments and
are in line with the response in dollar amounts presented in Table 2.5. Borrowers who pay
in full are the least responsive to the final term loan payment: their MPC is 6% and is offset
by an equivalent increase in payments, leaving their revolving balance unchanged. Minimum
payers have an MPC of about 15%, with a similar increase in payments, such that their
balance does not change as a fraction of the monthly installment. Finally, consumer for who
the credit card provides the marginal source of funds do not increase expenditures more than
full payers, although they do increase payments, which leads to a reduction in credit card
balance each month.
2.4.4 Term Loans
Figure 2.5 presents the propensity to take out a new term loan, segmented across new bank
loans and new store loans, for each categories of liquidity constraints.18 Two surprising
18Table 2.16 shows that the results previously presented on the credit card response are robust to the type of term
loan generating the increase in cash-on-hand. In both cases, minimum payers increase their expenditures, full payers
dot not respond to the increase in cash-on-hand and partial payers reduce their revolving balance.
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facts should be noted. First, the patterns of new term loan take outs are similar across all
groups. Second, the take out patterns differ across new store and new bank loans. There is
a transitory increase in the propensity of taking out a new bank loan around the month in
which the original term loan ends, while there is a permanent increase in the propensity of
taking out a new store loan that seems persistent over the period studied.
Just as new term loan expenditures can be segmented across store and bank loans,
it is possible to segment the sample according to the type of loan which was originally
contracted — and which is being used as instrument for the increase in cash-on-hand.
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 shows the propensity to take out new term loans for the sub sam-
ple of loans that were originated at the bank and at a merchant store, respectively. These
figures show interesting patterns: both the subsample of bank-originated and store-originated
loans have a permanent increase in the propensity to take out new store loans but only the
subsample of bank-originated term loans have the transitory increase in the probability of
new bank loans taken out.
Table 2.7 quantifies the average term loan response by segregating the response depending
on the original term loan being store-originated or bank-originated. The variable “During?”
is a dummy variable indicating whether the event study months is equal to 0 or 1, and
the “After?” variable is redefined as the event study month being strictly greater than
1. This allows me to separate the transitory and permanent effects noted in new term
loan expenditures. Panel (A) shows that both store-originated and bank-originated sample
increase expenditures in new store loans, although the effect is bigger for store-originated
loans because the baseline take-out rate is larger for this subsample. Panel (B) shows that
the increase in new bank loan expenditures is limited to the subsample of borrower who
originally had a bank-originated term loan. Appendix Table 2.18 further decomposes these
results in terms of liquidity constraints, and in terms of propensity to take out the new
terms. The results are in line with graphical evidence, and the average effects presented in
Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7: New Term Loans Response
Store-Originated Term Loans Bank-Originated Term Loans
(1) (2)
A. New Store Loans
During? 8.3658*** 0.6463***
(0.5946) (0.1796)
After? 7.1094*** 0.9438***
(0.7435) (0.2902)
R2 0.001 0.000
Observations 3,369,400 1,433,954
B. New Bank Loans
During? -0.8377 72.8071***
(0.9157) (3.1641)
After? -0.5513 26.3171***
(1.1298) (3.5246)
R2 0.002 0.007
Observations 3,369,402 1,433,963
Month F.E. YES YES
Quadratic Trend YES YES
Account Controls YES YES
Note: This table shows the average new term and bank loan expenditures, as segmented by the type of term loan originally
held by the borrower. The control variables grouped under “Account Characteristics” are taken in the four months period
prior to the start of the event study and consist of monthly term loan installment, external credit score, revolving limit on
the account, age of the account, age of the account-holder, average credit card and term loan balances, average monthly
purchases and a dummy variable indicating if the borrower pays for a reduced APR on the credit card. Standard errors
corrected for within-account heteroscedasticity are presented in parentheses. ***, ***, and * represent significance at the
1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Explaining the Increase in Term Loan Expenditures
Bank-Originated Term Loans.- There is a rational explanation for the transitory increase in
new bank loans being confined to the subsample of borrowers who originally held a bank loan.
At the end of each year, consumers who qualify can contribute to their retirement saving
and reduce their gross income by the amount of the contribution. This has the advantage
of reducing the amount of income tax that must be paid to the tax authority. Consumers
may want to contribute but they might not want to use their personal savings to make the
contribution. As a marketing strategy, the bank offers to take out term loans (of a 1 year
maturity) to cover for the contribution. It is optimal for consumers to use term loans to
make their contributions if the reduction in income tax is larger than the interest paid on
the loan. Many consumer make this contribution financed by a term in the same month each
year. The response in new bank loan expenditures for the subsample of consumers who had
a bank-originated term loan — and who are rolling into a new bank loan in the same month
of the following year — will exhibit a transitory seasonal effect.19 This explains why only
the subsample of borrowers who originally had a bank term loan roll over into a new bank
loan once the loan is repaid. Such behavior appears to be rational and therefore, should not
be interpreted as a failure of the PIH.
Store-Originated Term Loans.- Note that store-originated loans do not have seasonal
patterns because they are taken out uniformly throughout the year (see Figure 2.12). Ac-
cordingly, for the subsample of store-originated term loans, Figure 2.11 shows no change in
the propensity to take out new bank loans. However, there is still a permanent increase in
the propensity to take out a new store-originated term loan that is present in both subsam-
ples of borrowers with store-originated and bank-originated term loans. This behavior holds
for all groups of liquidity constraints. In particular, full payers have an abnormal increase of
0.3 percentage point in the monthly propensity to take out a new term loan after the first
one is repaid (23% on a monthly baseline of 1.3%), while for partial payers the increase is
of 0.2 percentage points (16.7% on a monthly baseline of 1.2%). This adds up to a monthly
19This is verified in the data by noting that the increase in bank loan coincides with the last month in which
consumers are allowed to make a contribution to their retirement account (see Figure 2.12). It is also verified by
talking with bank representatives.
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Table 2.8: Average Delinquency Transitions
Ct Lt Wt
Ct+1 0.945 0.463 0.000
Lt+1 0.055 0.513 0.000
Wt+1 0.000 0.024 1.000
% of Accounts 0.895 0.105 N/A
Note: This table shows the average transition probabilities between delinquency states. The states are defined as (C) if the
account is current, (L) if the account is at least one month late, (W ) if the account is written off due to a default or due
to bankruptcy.
abnormal increase in the propensity to take out store-loans of 0.5 percentage points, which
translates to 4% of the sample of unconstrained consumers behaving contrary to theoretical
predictions over the 8 months after the first term loan is repaid.
It is hard to rationalize such results with the PIH because unconstrained consumers should
not delay consumption until the reception of an increase in cash-on-hand. One explanation,
put forth by Thaler (1990), is that such consumers could be doing mental accounting. In
particular, these results would be consistent with a scenario in which some consumers force
themselves to finish repaying their original term loan before allowing themselves to purchase
a new “big-ticket” item via installment financing. For the econometrician, distinguishing
between liquidity constraints and such self-control mechanisms is usually hard to do. How-
ever, because the same groups of borrowers have a credit card behavior which is consistent
with a model in which they are potentially liquidity constrained, it is hard to rule out such
behavioral explanation.
2.4.5 Delinquency Response
Table 2.8 presents the proportion of accounts in each delinquency state, and the transition
matrix between them. On average, 89.5% of the active accounts (i.e. those not written-off)
are current, and the remaining 10.5% are delinquent. On average, 0.4% of active accounts
are written off each month. A total of 94.5% of current accounts remain current in the
next billing cycle, while 5.5% enter delinquency and virtually none are written off. Among
delinquent accounts, 46.3% cure in the following billing cycle, while 51.3% stay delinquent
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Figure 2.6: Delinquency
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Table 2.9: Delinquency, Write-offs and Liquidity Constraints
P(Lt+1|Ct) P(Ct+1|Lt) P(Dt+6) P(Bt+1|Lt)
A. Before vs After
After? -0.0430*** 0.0604*** -0.0022*** 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0001) (0.0005)
R2 0.134 0.196 0.267 0.150
Observations 4,315,865 487,500 4,531,889 487,500
B. Liquidity Constraints
After? × Min. Payer 0.0085*** 0.0652*** -0.0002 0.0010
(0.0005) (0.0038) (0.0002) (0.0007)
After? × Med. Payer 0.0013** 0.0432*** -0.0005*** 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0041) (0.0002) (0.0008)
After? -0.0456*** 0.0230*** -0.0022*** -0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0040) (0.0002) (0.0007)
R2 0.145 0.202 0.270 0.153
Observations 3,776,131 472,652 4,000,005 472,652
Month F.E. YES YES YES YES
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES YES
Account Controls YES YES YES YES
Delinquency Controls YES YES YES YES
Interactions YES YES YES YES
Note: This table shows the results of estimating equations (2.1) and (2.3) on the delinquency transitions. The results pre-
sented are the marginal effects estimated from a probit regression. The control variables grouped under “Account Char-
acteristics” are taken in the four months period prior to the start of the event study and consist of monthly term loan
installment, external credit score, revolving limit on the account, age of the account, age of the account-holder, average
credit card and term loan balances, average monthly purchases and a dummy variable indicating if the borrower pays for
a reduced APR on the credit card. Standard errors corrected for within-account heteroscedasticity are presented in paren-
theses. ***, ***, and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
and 2.4% are written off into default or bankruptcy.
Each month, an account can transition into one of three mutually exclusive delinquency
states: current (C), delinquent (L), and written-off (W ).20 Accounts transition from current
to delinquent when a monthly payment is missed (i.e., the sum of the minimum credit card
payment and the term loan installment). Accounts transition from delinquent to current
when the overdue amount is repaid. The write-off state is absorbing and results from either
bankruptcy or default (i.e., when an account spends six cycles delinquent).
Figure 2.6 presents preliminary evidence of the delinquency response to the anticipated
final term loan payment over the event-study. Panel (a) shows the average transitions into
and out of delinquency. After the final term loan payment, there is a discontinuous drop
20The delinquency state can also be further refined into the exact number of months past due.
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in the probability of entering delinquency, and a discontinuous increase in the probability
of curing the account. Panel (b) shows write-offs decomposed into bankruptcy filings and
defaults. Bankruptcy is presented conditional on the account being late, whereas default is
measured lagged by six months — because it takes six months for a loan to go from current to
written off when no additional payments are made on the account. There is a discontinuous
drop in the probability that the account will be written off due to default but there is no
discontinuous change in the probability of filing for bankruptcy. Because it takes six months
for an unproductive loan to be deemed defaulted (and be written-off), this shows that the
bank has the possibility of taking preemptive actions in mitigating the loss associated to
such events.
I model financial delinquency, defaut and bankruptcy using dynamic probit mod-
els, which are equivalent to discrete hazard models (Shumway, 2001; Gross and Soule-
les, 2002b), and report average partial effects. Table 2.9 shows the results of estimating
equations (2.1) and (2.2) on the probability of entering delinquency, of exiting delinquency,
of defaulting in 6 months, and of filing for bankruptcy in the next month. Panel (A) shows
that the final payment on the term loan leads to a decline of 4.3 percentage points in the
probability entering delinquency (67% decrease on a baseline of 6.4%). This provides strong
evidence that reducing debt payments leads to a decline in delinquency. The probability of
curing the account after the final term loan payment goes up by 6 percentage points (14.2%
increase on a baseline of 42.4%). This supports the evidence that lower debt repayment fa-
cilitate the transition out of delinquency. The probability that a borrower will default in six
months also goes substantially down. At an average rate of six-month-ahead default of 0.3%
before the final term loan payment, the results represent a 73% decrease in the probability
of the account being written off by the bank. Finally, there is no evidence of a change in the
probability of filing for bankruptcy induced by the final payment on the term loan.
Figures 2.13 and 2.13 show the delinquency results as segmented by type of liquidity
constraints. Panel (B) of Table 2.9 quantifies the effects. The probability of entering delin-
quency is relatively stable across categories of liquidity constraints, but the probability of
exiting delinquency is significantly larger for more constrained borrowers. The probability
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of defaulting is similar and there is still no effect on the probability of filing for bankruptcy.
These results have implications for the credit granting decision of financial institutions.
They show that there is a trade-off between granting additional credit to consumers and
potentially risking write-offs for those who do not have the ability-to-pay for their debt. In
particular, the results provide evidence that can be used by banks to calculate the trade-off
between additional interest revenue earned by granting a new term loan to a consumer and
the risk of write-off due to consumer default.
2.5 Extensions
The intention-to-treat research design used in the event-study implies that some accounts do
not comply with the anticipated month of final payment. Non-compliance happens when a
borrower takes out a new term loan prior to paying off the original one, or when a borrower
prepays the original term loan. Borrowers taking out a new term loan before the predicted
date of final payment still have a discontinuous decrease in their monthly debt payments, al-
though the required payments do not fully decrease to zero. However, borrowers who prepay
the term loan do not have such decrease at the anticipated payoff date. More importantly,
prepayment of the term loan could bias the results if unobservable variables correlate both
with the term loan prepayment and the outcomes studied. In this section I consider these
issues and show that the main results hold under different extensions.
2.5.1 Selection into Prepayment
The most important threat to identification comes from unobservable variables that could
potentially correlate with prepayment and subsequent consumption, debt repayment or delin-
quency patterns. This would violate the identifying assumption of orthogonality between
the final term loan payment and other outcomes of interest. Luckily, prepayment events can
be identified in the sample. A Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) is used to correct
for the potential sample selection induced by term loan prepayment. In such a model, the
decision to prepay the term loan is first modeled in a probit equation for which the dependent
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Table 2.10: Heckman Selection: Decision to Prepay
Expenditures Payments ∆Balance
(1) (2) (3)
A. Outcome Equations
After? × D 0.0828*** 0.0847*** -0.0413***
(0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0071)
D -1.6795*** -1.6275*** -0.0145
(0.0163) (0.0187) (0.0181)
After? -0.5996 3.1666 -2.8179
(1.6920) (1.9371) (1.8891)
IMR -190.0604*** -82.3137*** 60.0101***
(7.1221) (8.1559) (7.8616)
B. Selection Equation
Zero i Term 0.2397***
(0.0014)
After? × D 0.0000**
(0.0000)
D -0.0016***
(0.0000)
After? 0.0015
(0.0029)
All Observations 4,803,365
Censored Observations 1,167,300
Month F.E. YES
Quadratic Trend YES
Account Controls YES
Note: This table shows the result of estimating equation (2.2) using a Heckman selection model. The decision to prepay is
first modeled using a binary variable equal to 1 if the term loan is financed at 0% APR as the exclusion restriction.
variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the term loan is prepaid or not. A sample
correction variable is then created — the Inverse-Mills Ratio (IMR). This variable is used in
the second stage estimation to correct for sample selection in the outcome equations.
The Heckman selection model requires an exclusion restriction — in this case, a variable
that influences the decision to prepay the term loan but that does not influence the other
outcomes studied. Such an exclusion restriction is analog to an instrumental variable for the
case of an endogenous regressor. The institutional setting of the bank providing the data
leads to an ideal candidate for such exclusion restriction. Because some of the term loans
contracted at retail stores are provided with 0% APR, there is essentially no incentive for
the borrower to prepay them. Having a cost of capital equal to zero on the term loan should
negatively affect the probability of prepaying the term loan, although there is no obvious
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reasons as to why it would affect their subsequent consumption decisions. This variable is
therefore an ideal candidate for an exclusion restriction in modeling the prepayment decision.
The results of estimating the selection equation are presented in Panel B of Table 2.10.
The dummy variable indicating if the original term loan is financed under a 0% APR contract
is strongly significant and has the effect of increasing the probability that the term loan is not
prepaid by 24 percentage points. Given that about 75% of the term loans are not prepaid
this variable has a strong predictive power.
The IMR is then constructed and added to the outcome equations. This corrects the
conditional expectation function for potential bias induced by borrowers self-selecting into
term loan prepayment. Panels A of Table 2.10 presents the results. The marginal propen-
sity to consume out of reduced debt payments is still around 9% on the credit card, in line
with the results presented in the main analysis. Table 2.17 shows the results augmented
with the interactions of liquidity constraints. Again, the results are both qualitatively and
quantitatively in line with the baseline analysis: full payers do not respond, minimum pay-
ers increase credit card expenditures the most and partial payers decrease the credit card
balance. This provides evidence that the inclusion of some borrowers that prepay the term
loan in the intention-to-treat framework does not introduce a sample selection bias. The re-
sults go through even after considering the potential sample selection induced by borrowers
repaying their term loans before the final payment date.
2.5.2 Analysis of Compliers
The second extension looks at the effect of reduced debt installments on the subsample
of “compliers” and is presented in the first set of results in Table 2.11. The analysis con-
sists in estimating the baseline model only for the subsample of borrowers who finishing
repaying their term loan exactly in the month predicted one ahead. This is also called a
“perfect-compliance” analysis (Imbens and Rudin, 2015) and is similar to what previous
studies have done.21 In the context of this bank, it has the disadvantage of introduc-
21Most research using variation in debt payments has restricted the analyzed sample to observations for which the
loans were not prepaid and for which borrowers followed exactly the payment schedule (Stephens, 2008; Scholnick,
2013).
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ing a bias towards more constrained borrowers — who might be unable to increase their
payments on the term loan and prepay — and therefore potentially overestimates the ef-
fects found. Panel A of Table 2.11 shows that the consumption response on the credit card
is higher than the results presented in the main analysis: the MPC is estimated to be
12%. However, Panel B shows that the different group of constrained consumers behave
qualitatively as in the baseline analysis.
2.5.3 Analysis of As-Treated Observations
The third extension consists in analyzing each account exactly in the way they have been
treated, that is, to measure the term loan payoff date as the observed month in which the
term loan balance first decreases to zero, rather than using the predicted final payment date.
This is called an “as-treated” analysis (Imbens and Rudin, 2015). Although this provides
the exact timeline event of debt repayment, it has the disadvantage of allowing unobservable
windfall gains to correlate with both the term loan repayment and the outcomes studied. The
results are presented in the second set of results of Table 2.11 and show that the marginal
propensity to consume is underestimated by this type of analysis. The MPC on the credit
card is estimated to be 6%. Qualitatively, the different groups of borrowers respond similarly
to the baseline analysis.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to our understanding of the response of consumption, debt, and delin-
quency to an anticipated increase in cash-on-hand in the presence of liquidity constraints.
I use the end of a term loan as an event generating a predictable increase in cash-on-hand,
and to which unconstrained consumers should not respond. The data used allow me to
measure the consumption response arising from credit card and term loan expenditures on
the account. Term loans can be contracted at the bank or at selected retail stores. Store-
originated term loans are used to finance “big-ticket” items and therefore provide a measure
of the response of durable consumption to an increase in cash-on-hand — a dimension usually
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ignored by research using only credit card data. Relative to previous work, I introduce a new
framework to think about liquidity constraints in terms of the outside cost of funds faced by
borrowers. Payments posted on a revolving account make it possible to infer bounds on the
marginal cost of funds that borrowers are willing to pay to finance consumption. This allows
me to segment borrowers who we typically think of as unconstrained (in the quantity sense)
into borrowers who are paying high interest fees on their revolving balance and borrowers
who are paying their balance in full and therefore charged no interest.
Unconstrained consumers, who pay their credit card balance in full each month, do not
change their credit card expenditures. Consumers who make minimum credit card payments,
and who are more likely to be constrained, increase credit card expenditures and their revolv-
ing balance. Consumers for whom the credit card is the marginal source of funds decrease
their revolving balance. Surprisingly, the propensity to take out a new term loan increases for
all consumers, whether constrained or not. About 4% of unconstrained consumers delay tak-
ing out a new term loan until the original loan is repaid, contrary to theoretical predictions.
Because consumers behave according to a version of the PIH in which they are potentially
liquidity constrained with respect to their credit card, I interpret this abnormal term loan
response as evidence that some borrowers could be financing consumption according to men-
tal accounts (Thaler, 1990). In this particular case, such unconstrained borrowers seem to
refrain from borrowing on more than one term loan at a time. Although this hypothesis can
not be directly tested with these observational data, it is consistent with the dichotomous
consumption response on credit card and term loans.
Because the credit card and term loans are linked to the same account, the data also
allows me to quantify the causal effect of decreasing monthly debt payments on financial
delinquency. Delinquency is reduced after the final payment, with the greatest effect found
for constrained borrowers, leading to a substantial decrease in default probability. Such
results show that the presence of liquidity constraints has implications for the credit-granting
decision of financial institutions.
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2.7 Appendix
Table 2.12: Liquidity Constraints and Quantity Constraints
Low Util High Util
(0%-80%) (80%-100%) Total
Min. Payer 38,657 40,519 79,176
Med. Payer 57,892 6,522 64,414
Full Payer 115,225 208 115,433
Total 216,774 47,249 259,023
Note: This table shows the number of accounts in each category of payment behavior and liquidity constraints (in the quan-
tity sense), as well as their interactions.
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Table 2.13: Descriptive Statistics
Term vs Non-Term Accounts
Has Term No Term Diffrence
Mean/(Std. Dev) Obs. Mean/(Std. Dev.) Obs. Mean/(Std. Error)
Credit Card Balance 1,015 291,777 977 203,287 37.43***
(2,042) (1,832) (5.66)
Term Loan Balance 1,190 291,777 0 203,287 1,190.20***
(1,121) - (2.49)
Payments 436 291,777 514 203,287 -78.44***
(843) (1,171) (2.86)
External Score 898 291,777 908 203,276 -10.23***
(162) (180) (0.49)
APR 18.08 291,777 18.02 203,287 0.06***
(3.12) (3.21) (0.01)
Credit Card Limit 3,344 291,777 5,153 203,276 -1,809.23***
(4,365) (5,130) (13.56)
Term Loan Limit 3,158 291,777 1,283 203,287 1,874.70***
(2,712) (2,123) (7.18)
Reduced APR? 0.07 291,777 0.06 203,287 0.01***
- - (0.00)
Note: This table compares the samples of accounts included in the event study to a 10% random sample of accounts that never have
an active term loan. Averages are measured during the four months prior to the start of the event-study for the sample of borrowers
that have a term loan, and during the first four months observed in the dataset for accounts with no term loans.
Table 2.14: Descriptive Statistics
Bank vs Store Loans
Store-Originated Bank-Originated Diffrence
Mean/(Std. Dev) Obs. Mean/(Std. Dev.) Obs. Mean/(Std. Error)
Credit Card Balance 841 202,358 1,407 89,419 -565.83***
(1,904) (2,275) (8.13)
Term Loan Balance 979 202,358 1,669 89,419 -690.31***
(825) (1,494) (4.32)
Payments 420 202,358 472 89,419 -52.38***
(849) (828) (3.38)
External Score 910 202,358 872 89,419 38.01***
(152) (181) (0.65)
APR 18.28 202,358 17.63 89,419 0.65***
(2.92) (3.49) (0.01)
Credit Card Limit 3,411 202,358 3,192 89,419 218.93***
(4,506) (4,021) (17.52)
Term Loan Limit 3,405 202,358 2,599 89,419 805.95***
(2,522) (3,026) (10.79)
Reduced APR? 0.06 202,358 0.10 89,419 -0.05***
- - (0.00)
Note: This table compares the subsamples of accounts for which the increase in cash-on-hand is generated by a store-originated and
a bank-originated term loan. Averages are measured during the four months prior to the start of the event-study for both samples.
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Table 2.15: Credit Card Response: Store- and Bank-Originated Loans
Expenditures Payments ∆ Balance
(1) (2) (3)
A. Store-Originated Loan
After? × D 0.0400*** 0.0007 -0.0133
(0.0150) (0.0162) (0.0114)
After? -0.2539 3.1154 -0.6302
(1.8961) (2.1399) (1.7620)
D -0.3987** -0.3177** 0.0282
(0.1625) (0.1598) (0.0195)
R2 0.540 0.465 0.001
Observations 3,369,402 3,369,402 3,362,162
B. Bank-Originated Loan
After? × D 0.0946*** 0.1079*** -0.0178*
(0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0107)
After? -6.0987 -1.9569 -3.2148
(4.0024) (4.3001) (2.7556)
D -2.4716*** -2.3235*** -0.0166
(0.3844) (0.3808) (0.0206)
R2 0.478 0.384 0.002
Observations 1,433,963 1,433,963 1,425,445
Month F.E. YES YES YES
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES
Account Controls YES YES YES
Note: This table shows the response of credit card expenditures. Panel A and B respectively show the results for the subsam-
ples of accounts that have an increase in cash-on-hand generated by a store-originated and a bank-originated term loan.
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Table 2.16: Credit Card and Liquidity Constraints: Store- and Bank-Originated Loans
Expenditures Payments ∆ Balance
(1)
In Dollars
(2)
In Dollars
(3)
In Dollars
A. Store-Originated Loans
After? × Min. Payer 32.8965*** 9.6030*** 20.9535***
(2.1666) (2.7162) (2.2308)
After? × Med. Payer -0.0996 9.4177*** -13.3117***
(2.5467) (2.6916) (1.6575)
After? -2.6781 -0.1994 -3.2620*
(1.8355) (2.0643) (1.7129)
R2 0.533 0.457 0.002
Observations 2,869,010 2,869,010 2,862,001
B. Bank-Originated Loans
After? × Min. Payer 22.9760*** 4.3168 9.6999***
(3.4601) (3.7573) (2.2004)
After? × Med. Payer -13.4103*** 2.2807 -20.4356***
(4.1925) (4.4256) (2.2988)
After? 5.1537 15.6302*** -4.6193*
(3.6654) (4.0671) (2.7208)
R2 0.468 0.376 0.002
Observations 1,379,773 1,379,773 1,371,300
Month F.E. YES YES YES
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES
Account Controls YES YES YES
Baselines YES YES YES
Note: This table shows the response of credit card expenditures by liquidity constraints. Panel A and B respectively show
the results for the subsamples of accounts that have an increase in cash-on-hand generated by a store-originated and a
bank-originated term loan.
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Table 2.17: Heckman Selection and Liquidity Constraints
Expenditures Payments ∆Balance
(1) (2) (3)
A. Outcome Equations
After? × Min. Payer 33.3132*** 30.6609*** -5.5690**
(1.9278) (2.2226) (2.1706)
After? × Med. Payer -0.0998 15.5610*** -23.5227***
(2.0924) (2.4130) (2.3532)
After? 1.0975 2.9766 -1.6070
(1.9075) (2.1993) (2.1453)
IMR -88.6028*** -2.1873 47.9550***
(7.1631) (8.2601) (8.0220)
B. Selection Equation
Zero i Term 0.2760***
(0.0015)
After? × Min. Payer -0.0420***
(0.0032)
After? × Med. Payer -0.0179***
(0.0032)
After? 0.0207***
(0.0031)
All Observations 4,248,783
Censored Observations 1,055,875
Month F.E. YES
Quadratic Trend YES
Account Controls YES
Baselines YES
Note: This table shows the result of estimating equation (2.2) using a Heckman selection model. The decision to prepay is
first modeled using a binary variable equal to 1 if the term loan is financed at 0% APR as the exclusion restriction.
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Figure 2.12: New Term Loan Propensity
(Seasonal Patterns)
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Chapter 3
Are Income Shocks Predictable?
Income Shocks Transmission to Savings1
Abstract
We analyze the comovement of personal savings and income using administrative data
provided by a North American bank that records the sum of monthly direct deposit income
into its clients’ checking accounts. We investigate how permanent and transitory income
changes are smoothed by checking account balances. Transitory income changes, whether
positive or negative, have only transitory effects on checking account balances, suggesting that
consumption is excessively sensitive to them compared to theoretical predictions. Permanent
income changes lead to permanent adjustments in consumption and modest permanent
adjustments in checking account balances, consistent with theoretical predictions. We find
evidence of anticipation of future income changes as much as three months in advance.
JEL Classification: D12, D31, D91, E21.
1I am grateful to my committee members Stephen Shore (chair), Conrad Ciccotello, Georges Dionne and Glenn
Harrison for helpful comments.
3.1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature studying the sensitivity of consumption to income changes.2
In a model with complete markets, consumption can be fully insured against income changes.
In reality, although there exists a host of mechanisms available to insure labor income,
the hypothesis of full insurance is usually rejected.3 Alternatively, the rational-expectation
permanent income hypothesis (RE-PIH) assumes that savings are the only way to smooth
consumption against income changes (Friedman, 1957; Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954).
Personal savings can be used to smooth consumption from transitory income changes, but
they cannot permanently hedge consumption against permanent income drops. Under the
RE-PIH, permanent income changes therefore lead to permanent changes in consumption,
while transitory income changes do not substantially affect consumption. In this paper,
we test such predictions by studying the comovement of personal savings and income using
administrative data from a North American bank.
The response of consumption to changes in income depends on the predictability of the
income change. Under the RE-PIH, individuals adjust their consumption-saving decision
when a change in income is anticipated, not when it is realized. One line of research therefore
analyzes events in which changes in cash-on-hand are known to be predictable by individuals
to investigate the sensitivity of consumption to their realization.4 The typical empirical
findings show that, relative to the benchmark RE-PIH model, consumption overreacts to
predictable transitory changes in income and underreacts to permanent changes. Excess
sensitivity of consumption to income relative to the predictions of the RE-PIH has largely
been attributed to the presence of liquidity constraints because constrained consumers—
who are not able to adjust consumption when income is expected to increase—respond by
increasing consumption once the increase is realized (Deaton, 1991; Zeldes, 1989). The
2See literature reviews by Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010); Attanasion and Weber (2010); Fuchs-Schuendeln and
Hassan (2015)
3Examples include family networks, progressive income taxation, limited financial commitment (i.e. bankruptcy),
and unemployment insurance. See Blundell et al. (2008) for a discussion and relevant references.
4For example, changes in committed debt payments (Coulibaly and Li, 2006; Stephens, 2008; Scholnick, 2013;
d’Astous, 2016), income tax rebates (Agarwal et al., 2007; Souleles, 1999; Johnson et al., 2006), cost of attending
college (Souleles, 2000), etc.
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identification of unambiguously predictable income changes however comes at the cost of
context-specific results.
Alternatively, another set of papers models income realizations without identifying off of
predictable income changes, a literature pioneered by Hall (1978) and Flavin (1981) using
aggregate data, and Hall and Mishkin (1982) using household-level data. After conditioning
on observable variables, income changes are decomposed into transitory and permanent
shocks. Under the RE-PIH, the consumption response to unanticipated transitory shocks
should be small, while the response to unanticipated permanent shocks should result in
a permanent consumption change. In this context, an important assumption is that the
information sets of consumers and of the econometrician are the same or, in the words of
Deaton (1992): “the implausible but near-universal assumption that consumers’ expectations
and econometricans’ expectations are the same”.5
Recently, the comovement of consumption and income has been used to test for partial
consumption insurance (e.g. in a reduced form model, Blundell et al. (2008), and in a struc-
tural model, Heathcote et al. (2014)). If full insurance were available, consumption should
not vary with income shocks. However, the mechanisms by which individuals are insured
against labor income are not modeled in such papers and disentangling partial insurance
from advance information using only income and consumption data is notoriously difficult
(Kaufmann and Pistaferri, 2009).
The response of savings to income changes is also of interest. The buffer-stock version of
the RE-PIH (Carroll, 1997) shows that if consumers have a precautionary saving motive, are
impatient enough, and face income uncertainty, they build buffer-stocks of liquidity which can
be used to smooth out income shocks. The model gives rise to a target wealth-to-income ratio
under which savings grow in expectation, and above which savings decrease in expectation.
Using aggregate data Campbell (1987) argues that, because savings represent the residual
of total income (including capital income) on consumption, analyzing the comovement of
5Such assumption fails, for example, if what look likes a positive income shock to the econometrician is perceived
as a negative shock by a consumer expecting a bigger increase. In an effort to adress this issue, some studies exploit
survey responses on consumers’ subjective expectations of future income (Pistaferri, 2001; Alessie and Lusardi, 1997),
while others model how the information consumers have about their own income profile is gradually resolved in a
Bayesian learning model (Guvenen, 2007; Guvenen and Smith, 2014).
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income and savings can also serve to infer superior information consumers might have about
their future income. Under the RE-PIH, if consumers have advance information about
their future income, savings should counter income changes prior to their realization. Using
aggregate data however comes at the cost of aggregation assumptions.
In this paper, we study the comovement of personal savings and income using adminis-
trative data from a North American bank that records the monthly sum of direct deposits
into its clients’ checking accounts. We study how personal savings are used by individuals
to smooth income changes. We allow for asymmetric effects of positive and negative income
changes, and we decompose income changes into transitory and permanent shocks. The
dynamic response of savings to past and future income changes allows us to test whether
savings hold information about future income. If individuals have no advance information,
future changes in income should not predict current changes in savings. The use of high
frequency, administrative data are a new and ideal way to investigate these questions with
minimal measurement error on income and savings.6
We find that future income changes are anticipated up to three months in advance as
evidenced by increases (decreases) in checking account balances prior to an income decrease
(increase). Such anticipation is found both for permanent and transitory income changes.
Permanent changes lead to modest permanent adjustments of checking account balances:
a 10% increase (decrease) in income translates into a 0.5% increase (decrease) in checking
account balance. Surprisingly, transitory changes—whether positive of negative—are fully
absorbed by checking account balances within two to three months of their realization. We
calculate the implied consumption response from the changes in checking account balances
net of direct deposit changes. The results show that consumption moves almost in lock
step with permanent incomes changes, as predicted by the RE-PIH. However, compared to
the predictions of the RE-PIH, consumption is excessively sensitive to transitory changes in
6Alternatively, the standard in the literature is typically to use surveys such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), which collects income data for a panel of households since 1967 but only measures food consumption, or the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which has good measures of consumption but is a repeated cross-section and
has poor income measures. Some further alternatives include imputing consumption in the PSID using estimates from
the CEX, see Blundell et al. (2006). However, household surveys have issues with non-response and measurement
errors (Meyer et al., 2015).
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income.
3.2 Data
The data were provided by a regional subsidiary of a large North American bank. The
original dataset consists of monthly observations on every accounts the subsidiary’s clients
have at this institution for the period ranging from February 2010 to January 2015. There
is a total of 71,632 clients. The products are roughly defined as checking accounts, savings
(investment) accounts, revolving lines of credit, mortgages, and term loans. The bank records
the sum of monthly direct deposits into its clients’ checking accounts and such information
is available to us for the period ranging from November 2013 to January 2015 inclusively (15
month of observations).7 Because the focus of our analysis is on the response of personal
savings to changes in income, we limit our sample to this time period. We retain the 38,270
clients who are over 18 years old at the beginning of our study and who have a positive direct
deposit at least once during this period.
3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample, including demographic variables such
as the age and gender of the account-holder, an internal credit score, and occupation. The
credit score is constructed by the bank and varies from 0 to 8, with lower values representing
better credit quality. Occupation is originally segmented across 14 categories which we group
under white collar, blue collar, student, and retired or unemployed. Occupation is undefined
for about 4% of the sample.
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows that the average monthly direct deposit is $1,879. The
average month-to-month change is close to zero both in dollars and relative to the previous
month. Figure 3.1 shows empirical density functions for different measures of direct deposits.
Panel (a) shows the distribution of direct deposits in levels, truncated at the 99th percentile.
7The direct deposits recorded by the bank include income directly deposited by employers in the consumers’
checking accounts, but could also be retirement pension payments, employer or government benefits, employment
insurance payments, or salary bonuses.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. p5 p50 p95 Obs
A. Direct Deposit Income
Level (in $) 1,935 1,871 0 1,642 4,713 565,053
Monthly Change (in $) 1.96 1,559 -1,332 0 1,328 526,774
Monthly Change (in %) 0.03 0.54 -0.50 0 0.61 435,621
B. Checking Account
Level (in $) 4,027 10,254 -8 742 18,336 565,053
Monthly Change (in $) 3 4,851 -1,558 0 1,538 526,774
Monthly Change (in %) 0.04 1.51 -0.79 0 0.79 293,546
C. Savings Account
Level (in $) 17,534 66,579 0 0 98,148 565,053
Monthly Change (in $) 132 6,852 -5 0 409 526,774
Monthly Change (in %) 0.02 0.86 -0.05 0 0.08 158,725
D. Credit Line
Level (in $) 6,353 24,780 0 0 28,321 211,856
Monthly Change (in $) -44 15,743 -1,396 0 1,775 196,971
Monthly Change (in %) 0.19 4.60 -1 0 0.71 73,413
E. Demographics
Age 50 19 21 50 82 565,053
Male? 0.49 - - - - 565,053
Internal Credit Score 1 1.73 0 1 5 565,053
E. Occupation
Count Percentage Cumul
Undefined 1,247 3.26 3.26
White Collar 10,052 26.27 29.52
Blue Collar 15,497 40.49 70.02
Student 2,370 6.19 76.21
Retired/Unemployed 9,104 23.79 100.00
Total 38,270 100.00
Note: Panel A presents mean direct deposits as well as their monthly changes in dollars, and in percentage when the previ-
ous month’s direct deposit was greater than $500. Panel B presents checking accounts in levels, as well as their monthly
changes in dollars, and in percentage when the previous month’s balance was greater than $500. Panel C presents savings
accounts in levels, as well as their monthly changes in dollars, and in percentage when the previous month’s balance was
greater than $500. Panels D and E present demographics.
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50% of the monthly deposits are between $766 and $2,598. Note that there is an excess
realization of zeros in income-month observations which motivates our use of hurdle models
in the analysis. Panel (b) shows the monthly direct deposit changes in dollars. On average,
the change is close to zero, although the distribution has long tails. About 50% of the
monthly changes in direct deposits are between -$77 and $100. Panel (c) shows monthly
direct deposit changes in percentage of the previous month’s deposit for cases when it was
larger than $500. 50% of the changes are between -10% and 7%.
Panel (a) of Appendix Figure 3.5 shows average monthly direct deposits over the sample
period, segmented by occupation. White collar workers are the highest earners, retired or
unemployed worker face the least amount of income variation, and students have the lowest
average income. Panel (b) shows the average monthly direct deposit segmented by age and
illustrates the typical life-cycle pattern of earnings: it is hump-shaped in early years and
there is a notable decrease around the typical retirement age of 60 years old.
Panel B of Table 3.1 shows that the average checking account balance is $3,927. The
month-to-month change in balance is close to zero both in dollars and in percentage change.
Figure 3.2 shows empirical density functions for different measures of checking account bal-
ances. Panel (a) shows the distribution of balances in levels, truncated at the 95th percentile.
50% of the monthly balances are between $36 and $3,739. Panel (b) shows the monthly bal-
ance changes in dollars. On average, the change is close to zero and about 50% of the
monthly changes in direct deposits are between -$171 and $217. Panel (c) shows monthly
balance changes in percentage of the previous month’s balance for cases when it was larger
than $500. 50% of the changes are between -20% and 10%.
Panel (a) of Appendix Figure 3.6 shows average monthly checking account balances over
the sample period, segmented by occupation. Retired or unemployed worker keep the highest
balances. Panel (b) shows the average checking account balance segmented by age and shows
that the level of savings increases with age.
Panel C of Table 3.1 shows that the average savings account balance is $16,907. A large
portion of consumers do not have any money in a savings account, motivating again the
use of zero-inflated hurdle models in the analysis. The month-to-month changes in savings
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account balance are close to zero on average and feature less variation then changes in
checking account balance. Panel D shows the average amount drawn down on revolving
lines of credit.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Dynamic Model
In this section, we provide reduced form evidence of the comovement of income and personal
savings. We estimate a model in which log savings are explained by changes in log direct
deposits at different time horizons. We model savings as a two-part process in which the first
equation represents the probability of having positive savings in a given month (estimated
with a conditional logit model to allow for account fixed effects), and the second equation
represents the truncated-at-zero distribution of savings (estimated with a truncated OLS on
a log scale).
Changes in log direct deposits are modeled as a four-part process in which direct deposits
can be (1) positive both at time t − 1 and t, (2) positive at t − 1 and zero at t, (3) zero at
t − 1 and positive at t, and (4) zero at both t − 1 and t. We further decompose the direct
deposit changes into their positive and negative components to allow for asymmetric effects
of positive and negative income shocks on savings. Specifically, we estimate the model
ln(BALi,t|BALi,t > 0) =
3∑
j=−3
β+j ∆ lnDIR
+
i,t+j × I(DIRi,t+j > 0, DIRi,t+j−1 > 0)
+
3∑
j=−3
β−j ∆ lnDIR
−
i,t+j × I(DIRi,t+j > 0, DIRi,t+j−1 > 0)
+ δ1I(DIRi,t = 0, DIRi,t−1 > 0) + δ2I(DIRi,t > 0, DIRi,t−1 = 0)
+ δ3I(DIRi,t = 0, DIRi,t−1 = 0) + αi + λt + i,t,
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where
∆ lnDIR+i,t+j =

∆ lnDIRi,t+j if ∆ lnDIRi,t+j > 0
0 otherwise
and
∆ lnDIR−i,t+j =

∆ lnDIRi,t+j if ∆ lnDIRi,t+j < 0
0 otherwise.
We use the same explanatory variables in estimating the conditional logit model for the
probability of having positive savings in a given month. The specification includes account
and time fixed effects. BALi,t represents either the level of money in the consumer’s checking
or savings accounts, or the amount drawn down on the credit line account. β+j captures the
impact of positive income growth at different lags j, β−j captures the impact of negative
income growth at different lags j, and the three δ parameters capture the impact of the
different extensive margins of earnings. For example, δ1 measure the effect on savings of
going from positive earnings in the previous month to zero earnings in the current month.
Savings Reponse
The results from estimating this two-part model are presented in Tables 3.7 to 3.9, respec-
tively using checking account balances, savings account balances, and credit line usage as
independent variables. From these results, we construct different impulse response functions
of savings to transitory and permanent income shocks. Although the extensive margin of
savings is of some interest, we focus on the results of the distribution of savings conditional
on them being positive. The results presented in Tables 3.7 to 3.9 show that the effect of the
independent variables are almost invariably of the same sign for the probability of positive
savings and its level truncated at zero. In what follows, a transitory shock is a one-time
change in direct deposit happening at time 0, and a permanent shock is a series of changes
in direct deposits happening from time 0 and on.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.3 shows the comovement of checking account balances to positive
income shocks. A 10% transitory increase in direct deposit income at time t translates into a
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Response Functions - Checking Account
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(b) Checking Account Response to Negative Income Shocks
Note: This figure presents the impulse response functions of credit line usage for transitory income shocks (i.e. a one-
time dollar at time t), and permanent income shocks (i.e. one dollar from time t and on) calculated from Column (1) of
Table 3.7. Panel (a) presents the effect of positive shocks, and panel (b) presents the effect of negative shocks. The dashed
line represent the 95% confidence intervals.
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reduction in balance of 0.5% to 1% in the three months prior to its realization. The balance
increases by about 4% in the month the income increase is realized, and decreases back to its
original level in the next month. A permanent increase in direct deposits results in a larger
reduction in balance in the months prior to the income change: a 10% permanent increase
leads to a decrease checking account balance of -2.8% in the month prior to its realization.
After the permanent shock is realized, the balance increases by 0.5% and stabilizes at that
new level.
Panel (b) of Figure 3.3 shows that both permanent and transitory decreases in direct
deposit income translate into an increase in checking account balance in the month prior to
their realization. A transitory decline is absorbed by the checking account balance in about 2
months, whereas a 10% permanent decline translates into a permanent decrease in checking
account balance of about 0.5%. Together, these results are consistent with consumers having
a target level of checking account savings which adjusts with permanent but not transitory
income changes but not transitory, in the spirit of the buffer-stock version of the PIH (Carroll,
1997). There is evidence of anticipation of income shocks, as evidenced by checking account
balance movements prior to their realizations.
Figure 3.7 repeats the exercise using the consumer’s savings account. The results are
qualitatively similar to the checking account response, although they are noisier. Figure 3.8
repeats the exercise using the consumer’s credit line account (when the individual has one
active). The results show that consumers tend to draw down on the credit line one month
prior to a positive direct deposit shock, and seem to repay part of their credit line once the
income increase is realized. The opposite is true in the case of negative shocks.
Implied Consumption Response
To get a sense of the implications of these results on consumption, we back out the implied
consumption from the changes in checking account balances net of direct deposit changes.
The results are presented in Figure 3.4. The black bars represent the income shocks studied
and the grey bars represent the implied consumption response. Panel (a) shows that in
response to a permanent positive income shock, consumption increases in advance by up to
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10% per month. In the first month of the income increase, consumption increases by about
60% of the income increase and then stabilizes at 100% of the income increase. This is
consistent with the RE-PIH if we allow some consumers to gradually learn about the income
change in the months prior to its realization. Panel (b) shows the consumption response to a
permanent negative income shock. The anticipated reduction in consumption is concentrated
in the month prior to the income change and, once the income change is realized, it takes
two months for consumption to fully adjust downwards.
Panel (c) shows the response to a transitory positive income shock. There is evidence of
some anticipation in the month prior to its realization but the most surprising result is that
the increase is fully consumed within two months of it realization. This is not consistent with
the RE-PIH. A positive transitory shock does not have a big impact on lifetime resources,
and the resulting increase in consumption should be spread out over the consumer’s lifetime.
Similarly, in the case of a transitory negative shock, Panel (d) shows that the reduction
in consumption is concentrated in the three months around the transitory decline, also in
contradiction with predictions of the RE-PIH.
3.3.2 The Income Process
We now match our findings to the income process typically studied in the literature (e.g.
following Hall (1978), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Blundell et al. (2008) and many others).
However, in an attempt to correct for the excess realization of zeros in monthly direct deposits
(DIRi,t), we augment the income process by including it in a hurdle model.
8 We separate
the income process in two parts, first the probability that the income realization is positive,
and second the level of income on a log scale, conditional on a positive income realization.
The first equation for the dichotomous event of having zero or positive income in a given
month is modeled using a probit, such that
P(DIRi,t > 0|Zi,t) = Φ(β′1Zi,t). (3.1)
8An alternative to considering zero-inflated hurdle models is to winsorize the data such that zero realizations are
replaced with a low value (for example, the 5th percentile of the distribution of the variable) and then to control for
observations which have been winsorized by including a dummy variable in the regression. We have also used this
methodology and the results are qualitatively similar to using hurdle models.
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The second equation for positive monthly income realizations is modeled as
ln(DIRi,t|DIRi,t > 0) = β′2Zi,t + Pi,t + νi,t, (3.2)
where the vector of observable variables Zi,t consists of time dummies, a quadratic polynomial
in age and dummies for occupation. The permanent component of income is assumed to
follow a martingale process of the form
Pi,t = Pi,t−1 + ζi,t, (3.3)
with ζi,t serially uncorrelated. The transitory component of income is assumed to follow an
MA(1) process of the form9
νi,t = εi,t + θ1εi,t−1. (3.4)
Calling diri,t = ln(DIRi,t|DIRi,t > 0)− β′2Zi,t, the unexplained log earnings growth is then
given by
∆diri,t = ζi,t + ∆νi,t. (3.5)
The likelihood contribution for an observation can be written as
Li,t = {1− Φ(β′1Zi,t)}I(DIRi,t=0) × {Φ(β′1Zi,t) ln(DIRi,t|DIRi,t > 0)}I(DIRi,t>0), (3.6)
where I(.) represents the indicator function. Such model is considered by Duan et al. (1983)
for the case of medical expenditures. Estimating the parameters of this model is straight-
forward and can be done independently for the probit and the truncated-at-zero parts. Pre-
dictions of DIRi,t can be constructed by multiplying the predictions of each part of the
model,10
E[DIRi,t|Zi,t] = P(DIRi,t > 0|Zi,t)× E[DIRi,t|DIRi,t > 0, Zi,t]. (3.7)
9This can be generalized to an MA(q) process, where the order of lag q is estimated empirically. Evidence suggests
that an MA(1) process is sufficient in our data.
10In this particular case, if the error is i.i.d and normally distributed with variance σ2, we get that
E[DIRi,t|DIRi,t > 0, Zi,t] = eβ′2Zi,te0.5σ2 . However, Duan (1983) shows that if the error is not normally distributed,
a better “smearing” estimate can be derived where E[DIRi,t|DIRi,t > 0, Zi,t] = eβ′2Zi,tE[eµi,t ]. We use this smearing
estimate in making our predictions.
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Transmission of Income Shocks to Savings
In an analogy to the model of transmission of income shocks to consumption derived in
Blundell et al. (2008), we model the transmission of permanent and transitory income shocks
to (residual) savings. We model checking account balances (BALi,t) in a hurdle model. The
first equation for the dichotomous event of having zero or positive savings in a given month
is modeled using a probit, such that
P(BALi,t > 0|Zi,t) = Φ(γ′1Zi,t). (3.8)
The second equation for positive monthly income realizations is modeled as
ln(BALi,t|BALi,t > 0) = γ′2Zi,t + µi,t. (3.9)
Calling bali,t = ln(BALi,t|BALi,t > 0)−γ′2Zi,t, we then posit that the transmission of income
shocks to unexplained (to the econometrician) log savings can be written as
∆bali,t = φi,tζi,t + ψi,tεi,t + ξi,t. (3.10)
In this case, φi,t and ψi,t respectively measure the impact of permanent (ζi,t) and transitory
(εi,t) income shocks on savings, and ξi,t represents innovations in savings that are independent
of income shocks. The parameters φi,t and ψi,t can be viewed as self-insurance parameters
and measure how income shocks are transmitted to personal savings. In the case of full
self-insurance, income shocks are fully passed through to savings such that φi,t = ψi,t = 1. In
the case of no self-insurance, savings do not absorb incomes shocks and φi,t = ψi,t = 0. The
model allows for partial self-insurance, in which case the value of these parameters quantify
the extent to which savings are used to buffer income shocks.
This simple setting makes the strong assumption that consumers do not posses advance
information about their income changes. It also assumes that consumers distinguish between
permanent and transitory shocks in the same way we do, and that they hold rational expec-
tations about their income realizations. If consumers have superior information relative to
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the econometrician and take preemptive action to mitigate the effects of income shocks, the
estimated reaction of savings to income shocks will be a combination of both self-insurance
and advance information.
Identification
To identify the parameters of interest of the model, we start by imposing structure on
the earnings and savings processes presented previously. Assume that ζi,t, νi,t and ξi,t are
uncorrelated processes. Then
cov(∆dirt,∆dirt+s) =

var(ζt) + var(∆νt) if s = 0,
cov(∆νt,∆νt+s) if s 6= 0.
cov(∆balt,∆balt+s) =

φ2tvar(ζt) + ψ
2
t var(∆εt) + var(ξt) if s = 0,
0 if s 6= 0.
cov(∆balt,∆dirt+s) =

φtvar(ζt) + ψtvar(εt) if s = 0,
ψtcov(εt∆νt+s) if s > 0.
These three sets of equations identify the cross-sectional covariances of the processes consid-
ered. They can be estimated over the whole sample, over subgroups of the population, or
over specific times. As in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we can identify
var(ζt) = cov(∆dirt,∆dirt−1 + ∆dirt + ∆dirt+1), and,
var(εt) = −cov(∆dirt,∆dirt+1).
We then follow Blundell et al. (2008) in deriving the partial insurance parameters with
respect to permanent and transitory shocks. In their context, these insurance parameters
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reflect the comovement of consumption and income, whereas in our case they reflect the
comovement of savings and income. They are respectively identified by
Permanent Shock Insurance: φ =
E[∆balt(∆dirt−1 + ∆dirt + ∆dirt+1)]
E[∆dirt(∆dirt−1 + ∆dirt + ∆dirt+1)]
, and
Transitory Shock Insurance: ψ =
E[∆balt∆dirt+1]
E[∆dirt∆dirt+1]
.
We present the estimated covariance functions of the different processes pooled over the
whole sample in Table 3.2. Asymptotic standard errors clustered at the individual level are
reported. The unexplained earnings growth rates are negatively correlated, with the first
lag being the most economically significant. Unexplained savings growth rates, as measured
by the checking account, are also negatively correlated. The covariance between earnings
growth and savings growth shows a negative correlation one period ahead of a change in
earnings.
Appendix Table 3.4 shows the same covariance functions broken down by age and work
category. In this case, the regression model only includes time dummy. Panel A shows that
income shocks are more important for younger individuals, both in terms of the size of the
contemporaneous variance and its persistence. Individuals aged 66 or older face very little
income risk, as their income mostly comes from retirement payments or social security. For
all age groups, the covariance with a lag of order 2 or more seems mostly negligible. Panel B
shows the autocovariance function of the buffer stock, as measured by the checking account.
Younger individuals have more persistent changes in savings. Finally, Panel C shows the
covariance between income shocks and changes in the buffer stock of liquidity. This shows
that younger individual’s buffer stocks are most sensitive to changes in income. At the other
extreme, individuals age 66 and older are almost non-sensitive to changes in income, which
could be due to lower income risk (see Panel A).
Because these processes are only defined for the cases in which earnings and savings are
positive at both lags studied, we also present in Appendix Table 3.5 the changes in savings
(in levels) conditional on the possible extensive margins of income across two consecutive
months. The results show that going from a positive direct deposit in the previous month
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Table 3.2: Covariance of Processes
Direct Deposit Income Buffer Stock: Checking Accounts Income / Buffer Stock
cov(∆dirt∆dirt+s) cov(∆balt∆balt+s) cov(∆dirt∆balt+s)
4 -0.0010 -0.0193*** -0.0082***
(0.0009) (0.0045) (0.0011)
3 -0.0105*** -0.0379*** -0.0015
(0.0009) (0.0044) (0.0011)
2 0.0026** -0.0439*** 0.0011
(0.0009) (0.0046) (0.0010)
1 -0.0664*** -0.4292*** -0.0031**
(0.0014) (0.0074) (0.0010)
0 0.1857*** 1.2923*** 0.0523***
(0.0025) (0.0143) (0.0011)
-1 -0.0395***
(0.0011)
-2 0.0012
(0.0010)
-3 -0.0020
(0.0011)
-4 -0.0012
(0.0011)
Note: Estimation is pooled over all individuals and months in the sample. Asymptotic standard errors clustered at the
individual level are reported under the coefficient values.
to a negative direct deposit in the current month leads to a decrease in the level of savings
in the checking account of $282. Conversely, going from zero to positive direct deposits
increases the checking account balance by $169, and staying a zero direct deposits in two
consecutive months leads to a decrease in the balance of $52.
Table 3.3 presents the components of the variance of monthly direct deposit and the
partial insurance parameters pooled over the whole sample. The partial insurance parameters
with respect to income shocks show what fraction of the shocks are passed through to the
checking account. Consistent with the dynamic model presented in Section 3.3, checking
account balances do not react a lot to permanent income shocks: a 10% permanent change
in income leads to an adjustment of 1.2% in balances. However, checking account balances
move a lot more with transitory income shocks: a 10% transitory change in income leads to
a transitory adjustment of 6.4% in balances.
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Table 3.3: Variance Decomposition and Partial Insurance
Income Variance Decomposition Partial Insurance Parameters
Variance of
Innovations
Permanent
Component
Transitory
Component
Permanent
Shocks
Transitory
Shocks
0.1857*** 0.0218*** 0.0664*** 0.1166* 0.6387***
(0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0499) (0.0162)
Note: Estimation is pooled over all individuals and months in the sample. Asymptotic standard errors clustered at the
individual level are reported under the coefficient values.
Appendix Table 3.6 segments these numbers across ages and work categories. Young
individuals face the highest variance of permanent income shocks, which is also reflect in the
category of consumers which are students. The transitory variance of income seems to hit all
categories of occupation in the same way, except for consumers aged 66 and older, who are
for the most part retired. The measure of partial insurance to permanent shock is also noisy
across age and occupation categories, although for younger individuals, a 10% permanent
change in income leads to a significant adjustment of 2.3% in savings. The partial insurance
parameter to transitory income shocks is highest for the younger individuals in the sample.
3.4 Discussion, Limitations and Potential Extensions
In this paper, we study how personal savings are used by individuals to smooth permanent
and transitory income shocks. Permanent shocks lead to modest permanent adjustments of
checking account balances while transitory shocks are fully absorbed by checking account
balances within two to three months of their realization. The results show that consumption
moves in lock step with permanent incomes changes, as predicted by the RE-PIH, but that
consumption is also excessively sensitive to transitory changes in income. We find evidence of
advance information about future income contained in savings, as evidenced by movements
in checking account balances prior to income changes.
There are limitations in using observational data to infer consumers’ reaction to income
changes. First, using data from a single bank does not allow us to see substitution across
accounts at different banks. This can be problematic if consumers systematically respond to
income changes by moving money in and out of their checking accounts at this bank, and
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into accounts at other financial institutions. Second, we analyze the response of consumers
to realized income changes, but the way consumers form expectations about income shocks
matters for the way they respond to them. In particular, consumers’ subjective expectation
about income changes could differ from the way they are modeled in this paper. Investigat-
ing the dynamics of income and savings potentially elicits advance information about income
changes included in saving behavior but it cannot fully capture the timing and nature of
subjective beliefs. What we might classify as a positive shock could well be perceived nega-
tively by a consumer who was expecting a higher increase, and what we identify as transitory
could have been expected to be permanent by the consumer.
One potential extension to our analysis would be to elicit the consumer’s subjective ex-
pectations about their future income changes in a controlled laboratory experimental setting.
One could then test whether the income process typically used in the literature effectively
captures the subjective beliefs of consumers about the sign and durability of income shocks.
The response to income shocks could then be analyzed conditional on consumers’ subjec-
tive expectations, thereby augmenting the results found when survey responses about future
income growth are used (Pistaferri, 2001; Alessie and Lusardi, 1997).
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3.5 Appendix
Table 3.4: Autocovariance of the Processes
(Segmented by Age and Occupation)
Pooled Age Occupation
All Sample 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+ White Collar Blue Collar Student Retired/Unemp.
A. cov(∆dirt∆dirt+n)
0 0.1852*** 0.3683*** 0.2459*** 0.2215*** 0.1866*** 0.1839*** 0.0609*** 0.1917*** 0.1988*** 0.3922*** 0.1097***
(0.0025) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0087) (0.0068) (0.0051) (0.0031) (0.0060) (0.0035) (0.0130) (0.0040)
1 -0.0664*** -0.0858*** -0.0793*** -0.0821*** -0.0711*** -0.0800*** -0.0329*** -0.0716*** -0.0697*** -0.0857*** -0.0520***
(0.0014) (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0019) (0.0054) (0.0027)
2 0.0026** -0.0184*** -0.0063* -0.0014 -0.0009 0.0156*** 0.0107*** -0.0028 0.0010 -0.0208*** 0.0155***
(0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0037) (0.0018)
3 -0.0105*** -0.0344*** -0.0038 -0.0044 -0.0065* -0.0149*** -0.0074*** -0.0042* -0.0093*** -0.0362*** -0.0133***
(0.0009) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0042) (0.0019)
4 -0.0009 -0.0160*** -0.0075*** -0.0077** -0.0019 0.0085*** 0.0054** -0.0048* -0.0027** -0.0211*** 0.0103***
(0.0009) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0039) (0.0021)
B. cov(∆balt∆balt+n)
0 1.2925*** 2.1687*** 1.7729*** 1.7551*** 1.3369*** 1.0216*** 0.5365*** 1.3670*** 1.4716*** 1.9258*** 0.7990***
(0.0143) (0.0523) (0.0382) (0.0449) (0.0326) (0.0274) (0.0219) (0.0281) (0.0233) (0.0766) (0.0233)
1 -0.4295*** -0.7463*** -0.6142*** -0.5972*** -0.4542*** -0.3452*** -0.1489*** -0.4345*** -0.5121*** -0.6689*** -0.2493***
(0.0074) (0.0279) (0.0196) (0.0273) (0.0164) (0.0135) (0.0108) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0413) (0.0106)
2 -0.0440*** -0.0978*** -0.0649*** -0.0537** -0.0492*** -0.0281** -0.0110* -0.0667*** -0.0426*** -0.0506* -0.0210***
(0.0046) (0.0194) (0.0118) (0.0170) (0.0108) (0.0090) (0.0056) (0.0091) (0.0084) (0.0242) (0.0063)
3 -0.0377*** -0.0601** -0.0608*** -0.0607*** -0.0311** -0.0353*** -0.0113* -0.0403*** -0.0478*** -0.0705** -0.0185**
(0.0044) (0.0186) (0.0122) (0.0148) (0.0108) (0.0085) (0.0055) (0.0086) (0.0078) (0.0241) (0.0064)
4 -0.0195*** -0.0351 -0.0175 -0.0498** -0.0444*** 0.0121 -0.0083 -0.0245** -0.0276*** -0.0250 -0.0037
(0.0045) (0.0189) (0.0127) (0.0158) (0.0103) (0.0092) (0.0053) (0.0090) (0.0075) (0.0267) (0.0067)
C. cov(∆dirt∆balt+s)
-4 -0.0012 -0.0105* 0.0008 0.0062 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0021** 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0107 -0.0026*
(0.0011) (0.0053) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0079) (0.0013)
-3 -0.0021 -0.0038 -0.0063 -0.0104** -0.0018 0.0019 0.0012 0.0009 -0.0061** -0.0065 0.0029*
(0.0010) (0.0050) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0073) (0.0012)
-2 0.0012 -0.0156*** 0.0074* 0.0106** 0.0024 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0079*** -0.0204** -0.0015
(0.0010) (0.0047) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0066) (0.0012)
-1 -0.0393*** -0.0800*** -0.0668*** -0.0598*** -0.0475*** -0.0289*** -0.0060*** -0.0442*** -0.0512*** -0.0747*** -0.0124***
(0.0011) (0.0047) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0073) (0.0014)
0 0.0525*** 0.1267*** 0.0810*** 0.0750*** 0.0566*** 0.0374*** 0.0099*** 0.0532*** 0.0646*** 0.1237*** 0.0198***
(0.0011) (0.0050) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0008) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0078) (0.0014)
1 -0.0033*** 0.0033 -0.0103** -0.0137*** -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0050** -0.0057*** 0.0093 -0.0018
(0.0010) (0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0067) (0.0013)
2 0.0010 0.0009 0.0008 0.0072 -0.0049 0.0010 0.0018* 0.0027 -0.0004 0.0006 0.0020
(0.0010) (0.0048) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0072) (0.0013)
3 -0.0016 -0.0070 -0.0024 -0.0059 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0015 -0.0041 -0.0018 -0.0098 0.0017
(0.0011) (0.0050) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0077) (0.0017)
4 -0.0082*** -0.0117* -0.0105** -0.0098* -0.0127*** -0.0053** -0.0047*** -0.0100*** -0.0093*** -0.0027 -0.0061***
(0.0011) (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0032) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0077) (0.0013)
Note: Estimation is pooled over all individuals and months in the sample. Asymptotic standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported under the coefficient
values.
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Table 3.7: Checking Account
(1) (2)
log(BALi,t) P(BALi,t > 0)
F3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ -0.0506*** -0.0397
(0.0104) (0.0349)
F2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ -0.1655*** -0.2754***
(0.0123) (0.0363)
F.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ -0.2771*** -0.4043***
(0.0136) (0.0390)
∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.1033*** 0.2215***
(0.0129) (0.0418)
L.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.0484*** 0.2068***
(0.0131) (0.0400)
L2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.0635*** 0.0981***
(0.0121) (0.0377)
L3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.0369*** -0.0007
(0.0108) (0.0366)
F3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− -0.0019 0.0844***
(0.0104) (0.0323)
F2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− -0.0296** 0.1071***
(0.0120) (0.0349)
F.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− -0.2667*** -0.3831***
(0.0134) (0.0403)
∆ log(DIRi,t)
− -0.1221*** -0.1113***
(0.0134) (0.0388)
L.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0411*** 0.0559
(0.0127) (0.0376)
L2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0289** 0.1279***
(0.0120) (0.0353)
L3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0454*** 0.0790**
(0.0116) (0.0363)
I(DIRt = 0, DIRt−1 > 0) -0.1695*** -0.4723***
(0.0243) (0.0604)
I(DIRt > 0, DIRt−1 = 0) 0.0771*** 0.3120***
(0.0221) (0.0631)
I(DIRt = 0, DIRt−1 = 0) -0.4087*** -0.4591***
(0.0250) (0.0483)
Month F.E. YES YES
Account F.E. YES YES
R2 0.025
Observations 285,738 76,804
Note: This table presents the estimation of a hurdle model on savings, as measured by checking accounts. Column (1)
presents the OLS estimation of log changes in balance for cases where the balance was positive in periods t − 1 and t.
Columns (2) to (3) are estimated by conditional logit models. Column (2) presents the results for the probability that the
balance was positive at t − 1 and zero at t. Column (3) presents the results for the probability that the balance was zero
at t− 1 and positive at t. Column (4) presents the results for the probability that the balance was zero at t− 1 and at t.
Account fixed effects and time dummies are included in all specifications.
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Table 3.8: Savings Account
(1) (2)
log(BALi,t) P(BALi,t > 0)
F3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ -0.0212 -0.2685***
(0.0157) (0.0720)
F2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ -0.0690*** -0.2102***
(0.0182) (0.0750)
F.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ -0.0916*** -0.2838***
(0.0191) (0.0798)
∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ -0.0448** -0.2764***
(0.0186) (0.0780)
L.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ -0.0021 -0.2463***
(0.0204) (0.0776)
L2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.0035 -0.1300*
(0.0196) (0.0737)
L3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.0177 0.0486
(0.0165) (0.0752)
F3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− -0.0076 -0.0357
(0.0155) (0.0721)
F2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− -0.0215 -0.1076
(0.0163) (0.0762)
F.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− -0.0467** -0.1192
(0.0184) (0.0796)
∆ log(DIRi,t)
− -0.0139 -0.0564
(0.0206) (0.0802)
L.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− -0.0009 0.0215
(0.0192) (0.0785)
L2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0091 -0.0164
(0.0191) (0.0780)
L3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0073 -0.0563
(0.0191) (0.0791)
I(DIRt = 0, DIRt−1 > 0) -0.0770** -0.2491*
(0.0377) (0.1443)
I(DIRt > 0, DIRt−1 = 0) -0.0291 -0.4060***
(0.0364) (0.1439)
I(DIRt = 0, DIRt−1 = 0) -0.1327*** -0.5179***
(0.0452) (0.1179)
Month F.E. YES YES
Account F.E. YES YES
R2 0.002
Observations 118,867 17,217
Note: This table presents the estimation of a hurdle model on savings, as measured by savings accounts. Column (1) presents
the OLS estimation of log changes in balance for cases where the balance was positive in periods t− 1 and t. Columns (2)
to (3) are estimated by conditional logit models. Column (2) presents the results for the probability that the balance was
positive at t − 1 and zero at t. Column (3) presents the results for the probability that the balance was zero at t − 1 and
positive at t. Column (4) presents the results for the probability that the balance was zero at t− 1 and at t. Account fixed
effects and time dummies are included in all specifications.
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Table 3.9: Credit Line Usage
(1) (2)
log(BALi,t) P(BALi,t > 0)
F3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.0188 0.0823
(0.0146) (0.0527)
F2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.0502*** 0.4072***
(0.0164) (0.0572)
F.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.1082*** 0.5636***
(0.0188) (0.0612)
∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.0025 -0.0572
(0.0184) (0.0588)
L.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.0170 -0.0469
(0.0178) (0.0577)
L2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ 0.0069 -0.0989*
(0.0169) (0.0538)
L3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
+ -0.0099 -0.0956*
(0.0147) (0.0520)
F3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0147 0.0714
(0.0138) (0.0485)
F2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0181 0.0417
(0.0161) (0.0540)
F.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0916*** 0.5463***
(0.0181) (0.0573)
∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0860*** 0.3318***
(0.0194) (0.0564)
L.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0316* 0.0046
(0.0175) (0.0550)
L2.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0407*** 0.0268
(0.0158) (0.0527)
L3.∆ log(DIRi,t)
− 0.0169 0.0207
(0.0166) (0.0519)
I(DIRt = 0, DIRt−1 > 0) -0.0529 0.0464
(0.0326) (0.1086)
I(DIRt > 0, DIRt−1 = 0) 0.0005 -0.2387**
(0.0302) (0.1068)
I(DIRt = 0, DIRt−1 = 0) 0.0279 0.2625***
(0.0284) (0.0923)
Month F.E. YES YES
Account F.E. YES YES
R2 0.006
Observations 54,952 41,641
Note: This table presents the estimation of a hurdle model on credit line utilization. Column (1) presents the OLS esti-
mation of log changes in balance for cases where the balance was positive in periods t − 1 and t. Columns (2) to (3) are
estimated by conditional logit models. Column (2) presents the results for the probability that the balance was positive at
t− 1 and zero at t. Column (3) presents the results for the probability that the balance was zero at t− 1 and positive at t.
Column (4) presents the results for the probability that the balance was zero at t − 1 and at t. Account fixed effects and
time dummies are included in all specifications.
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Figure 3.5: Direct Deposits by Age and Occupation
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(b) Average Monthly Direct Deposit by Age
Note: Panel (a) shows the average monthly direct deposits segmented by occupation over the period covered by the data.
Panel (b) shows the average monthly income direct deposits segmented by age.
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Figure 3.6: Checking Account Balances by Age and Occupation
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(b) Average Checking Account Balances by Age
Note: Panel (a) shows the average monthly direct deposits segmented by occupation over the period covered by the data.
Panel (b) shows the average monthly income direct deposits segmented by age.
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Response Functions - Savings Account
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(a) Savings Account Response to Positive Income Shocks
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Note: This figure presents the impulse response functions of credit line usage for transitory income shocks (i.e. a one-
time dollar at time t), and permanent income shocks (i.e. one dollar from time t and on) calculated from Column (1) of
Table 3.8. Panel (a) presents the effect of positive shocks, and panel (b) presents the effect of negative shocks. The dashed
line represent the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Response Functions - Credit Line Usage
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(b) Negative Income Shocks
Note: This figure presents the impulse response functions of credit line usage for transitory income shocks (i.e. a one-
time dollar at time t), and permanent income shocks (i.e. one dollar from time t and on) calculated from Column (1) of
Table 3.9. Panel (a) presents the effect of positive shocks, and panel (b) presents the effect of negative shocks. The dashed
line represent the 95% confidence intervals.
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